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ABSTRACT
Over the last few decades, research in affective neuroscience has led to considerable insights into
the biology of fear and anxiety. For those in the practice of psychotherapy, these advances hold
the potential for explaining the evolutionary utility of these emotions and targeting
psychotherapeutic interventions to neurobiological correlates when these emotions go awry. The
conversation of neuroscience, however, has yet to find a comfortable place in the therapy room.
Translational and conceptual disparities owing to the historical split between psychology and
neuroscience, continue to present challenges to their integration. The present study seeks to
reframe clinicians’ understanding of the biological underpinnings of fear and anxiety from a
static model governed by genetic predisposition and chemical imbalances, to a dynamic process
that focuses on the environment’s impact on biology. The following topics will be addressed:
What are the neurobiological processes of fear and anxiety? Why did they evolve to serve
adaptive purposes? What are the conditions in which disorders of anxiety and fear emerge? To
answer these questions, this review of the literature discusses how fear and anxiety centers in the
mammalian brain were shaped through phylogenetic development to respond to physical and
interpersonal threat, and how fear and anxiety continue to benefit in learning and defensive
action. An updated view of the neuroscience of fear and anxiety is also reviewed detailing the
functions of known structures and involved pathways. Risk factors for panic and anxiety
disorders, the neurological impacts of failure of coping with fear and anxiety are explored, and
the application of psychotherapy are discussed. These findings will be applied towards a concise
handbook on the neuroscience of fear and anxiety to provide a narrative of an adaptive model for
use in the therapy room.

Chapter 1. Literature Review
Epidemiology
Disorders of anxiety and fear continue to pose serious health issues, constituting the most
common class of psychiatric disorders in child and adult populations in the United States
(Kessler et al., 2012). Lifetime prevalence data reflect that anxiety disorders affected over one
quarter (25.1%) of children and adolescents between the ages of 13-18 (Merikangas et al., 2010)
and 28.8% of adults (Kessler, Berglund, & Demler, 2005). Anxiety disorders also have a higher
level of comorbidity than any other mental disorder in adults, most frequently co-occurring with
mood and substance disorders (Barlow, 2002).
In 2005, panic disorders had a 12-month prevalence rate of 2.7% in the U.S. adult
population (Kessler, Chiu, & Demler, 2005) and lifetime prevalence rate of 2.3% in children and
adolescents ages 13-18 (Merikangas et al., 2010). In adults, panic attacks are highly comorbid
with conditions across the anxiety disorders spectrum, with strongest associations found between
panic attacks and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), agoraphobia, generalized anxiety
disorder (GAD), obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Individuals suffering from panic attacks
were also at higher risk of being diagnosed with at least two anxiety disorders, and significantly
increased risk of being diagnosed with mental disorders across the diagnostic spectrum
(Goodwin et al., 2004).
Search for the Biology of Fear and Anxiety
Despite the prevalence data, our understanding of the biology underlying fear and anxiety
continues to evolve. The search for the biological origins of fear and anxiety has had a longstanding history, and originated from interest in their pathological forms. In the 17th century,
disturbances of fear and anxiety, or hysteria at the time, were believed to originate from the
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nerves and the brain. Given their myriad expressions and wide phenotypic overlap, shifts in the
origin and meaning of their physical and mental expressions also presented an equally longstanding conundrum over time and cultural contexts. Before the late 19th century, symptoms of
anxiety were found in medical classifications dedicated to the heart, ear, gut, and brain, and were
treated as physical ailments (Berrios, 1999). At the turn of the 20th century, Freud, the
neurologist, attempted to elucidate the neurobiological attributions of anxiety in A Project for a
Scientific Psychology. This endeavor, however, was ultimately abandoned due to prevailing
cultural ideas about fear and anxiety during his time (J. M. Woody & Phillips, 1995).
Consequently, his influential conceptualization of pathological anxiety (anxiety-neurosis) was
not attributed to the brain, but to sexual drives that formed the basis of virtually all psychological
disorders (Berrios, 1999).
Biological explanations for fear and anxiety also proved elusive through the evolution of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Since the first edition in 1952
through DSM-IV, references to the biological underpinnings of their pathologies centered largely
on genetic heritability. Discussion of environmental impacts on physiology, however, was
largely absent (American Psychiatric Association, 1952, 1994). Instead, the primary focus of the
DSM relied on clustering and classifying features of pathological thoughts, emotions, and
behaviors (clinical descriptors). Over subsequent iterations of the DSM, one artifact of relying
on clinical descriptors was the expansion of diagnostic categories under the umbrella of Anxiety
Disorders in both number and complexity, and shifts in the relationship between fear and anxiety
(see Table 1; Barlow, Brown, & Craske, 1994).
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Table 1
Anxiety Disorders Through the DSM
1952 DSM I
PSYCHONEUROTIC
DISORDERS
40.0
40.1
40.2
40.3
40.4
40.5
40.6

Anxiety
Reaction
Dissociative
Reaction
Conversion
Reaction
Phobic
Reaction
Obsessive
Compulsive
Reaction
Depressive
Reaction
Psychoneurotic,
Other

1968 DSM II
NEUROSIS

300.0
300.1
300.13
300.14
300.2
300.3
300.4
300.5
300.6

300.7
300.8
300.9

Anxiety Neurosis
Hysterical Neurosis
Conversion Type
Dissociative Type
Phobic Neurosis
Obsessive
Compulsive
Neurosis Depressive
Neurosis
Neurasthenic
Neurosis
(Neurasthenia)
Depersonalization
Neurosis
(Depersonalization
Syndrome)
Hypochondriacal
Neurosis
Other Neurosis
[Unspecified
Neurosis]

1980 DSM III
ANXIETY DISORDERS
Anxiety States
(or Anxiety Neurosis)
300.01
300.02
300.30

Panic Disorder
Generalized
Anxiety
Disorder
Obsessive
Compulsive
Disorder or
Obsessive
Compulsive
(Neurosis)

1987 DSM III-R
ANXIETY DISORDERS
(or Anxiety and Phobic
Neuroses)
300.21
300.01
300.22
300.23
300.29
300.30

Phobic Disorders
(or Phobic Neurosis)
300.21
300.22
300.23
300.24
308.30

309.81
300.00

Agoraphobia
with Panic
Attacks
Agoraphobia
without Panic
Attacks
Social Phobia
Simple Phobia
Post-traumatic
Stress
Disorder,
Acute
Post-traumatic
Stress
Disorder,
Atypical
Anxiety
Disorder

309.89
300.02
300.00

Panic Disorder
with Agoraphobia
Panic Disorder
without
Agoraphobia
Agoraphobia
without History of
Panic Disorder
Social Phobia
Simple Phobia
Obsessive
Compulsive
Disorder (or
Obsessive
Compulsive
Neurosis)
Post-traumatic
Stress Disorder
Generalized
Anxiety Disorder
Anxiety Disorder
NOS

1994 DSM IV
ANXIETY DISORDERS

----300.21
300.01
300.22
300.29
300.23
300.3
309.81

308.3
300.02
300.0

Panic Attack
(not codable)
Agoraphobia
(not codable)
Panic Disorder
With Agoraphobia
Panic Disorder
Without
Agoraphobia
Agoraphobia
without a History
of Panic Disorder
Specific Phobia
(formerly Simple
Phobia)
Social Phobia
(Social Anxiety
Disorder)
ObsessiveCompulsive
Disorder
Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder
(Acute, Chronic,
or With Delayed
Onset)
Acute Stress
Disorder
Generalized
Anxiety Disorder
Anxiety Disorder
NOS

DSM IV-TR
ANXIETY DISORDERS

----300.21
300.01
300.22
300.29
300.23
300.3
309.81

308.3
300.02
300.0

Panic Attack
(not codable)
Agoraphobia
(not codable)
Panic Disorder With
Agoraphobia
Panic Disorder
Without
Agoraphobia
Agoraphobia
without a History of
Panic Disorder
Specific Phobia
Social Phobia
(Social Anxiety
Disorder)
ObsessiveCompulsive
Disorder
Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder (Acute,
Chronic, or With
Delayed Onset)
Acute Stress
Disorder
Generalized Anxiety
Disorder
Anxiety Disorder
NOS
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To date, anxiety and panic disorders continue to form a complicated picture. In the
fourth edition of the DSM, disorders of anxiety and panic encompassed 11 distinct categories,
characterized by symptoms ranging from panic attacks in phobic disorders, to worry and
rumination of generalized anxiety disorder, to intense somatic re-experiencing found in
individuals suffering from post-traumatic stress (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). The
shifting continued in DSM-5 as evidenced by the removal of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder and
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder from the Anxiety Disorders umbrella, and establishing them as
their own distinct disease entities, as well as the lowering of symptom thresholds in category of
Anxiety Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Berrios (1999) observed that
despite these shifts, “none of the clinical phenomena or ‘symptoms’ included under the various
‘anxiety disorders’ was new. What had changed was their relative emphasis, the permutations
and combinations in which they are clustered up, and their social meaning” (p. 83).
Though the promise of merging the biology and psychology of these emotions existed
with the emergence of enhanced techniques to study the brain, discrepant views by psychology
and neuroscience may have led to more of a conundrum. In part, the historical split between the
study of the physical brain (neuroscience) and study of the mind (psychology) may have led to
notable contrasts between fields in our understanding of anxiety and panic. Barlow et al. (1994)
suggested that most biological investigators assumed that panic is fundamentally different from
anxiety and most likely represents a form of brain dysfunction. In contrast, psychological and
cognitive investigators assert that panic is not qualitatively different from anxiety, arguing
instead that panic represents anxiety focused on somatic sensations that builds quickly in a
positive feedback loop because of a misattribution of these sensations. Consequently, a lack of
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symbiosis between psychology and neuroscience may have led to wide discrepancies in
definitions, theoretical assumptions, and research focus (Cozolino, 2006).
Adaptive Relationship Among Stress, Fear, and Anxiety
Throughout evolution, living organisms have strived to maintain a complex and dynamic
equilibrium of their internal environment that is believed to sustain life (Habib, Gold, &
Chrousos, 2001). This balance, or homeostasis, is challenged constantly by external
(environmental) and internal (psychological) demands. Hans Selye (1949) coined the term stress
to describe the body’s non-specific response to demands for change. Although he acknowledged
that stress may have positive influences (eustress), stress more commonly refers to its negative
influences (distress): a state of homeostasis that is threatened or perceived to be threatened.
To counter these demands, or stressors, the ability of an organism to adapt to its
environment is of vital importance (McEwen, 1999). When confronted with more severe forms
of stress, the brain recruits responses that promote adaptive, survival functions and a return to
equilibrium or homeostatic patterns. These processes persist until an emergency has been
survived and are considered adaptive if the emergency is transitory and the stress response is
shut off quickly (Darnaudéry & Maccari, 2008). This process is of adaption is referred to as
allostasis and is described as maintaining stability through change (McEwen & Gianaros, 2010;
Sterling & Eyer, 1988).
Fear and anxiety. Fear and anxiety represent adaptive stress responses employed to
achieve a return to homeostatic balance. They represent survival functions that address the
immediate and preparatory needs of an organism to bring closure to a situation (LeDoux, 2012).
Broadly, fear and anxiety signal the presence of threat and motivate an organism to take action
aimed at adapting to or reducing the impact of the threat (Pêgo, 2010). Although intricately
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related and often used interchangeably, animal and human studies reveal that fear and anxiety
differ along several dimensions including their triggers, timing, and purpose (see Table 2).
Fear, or panic, is an emotional alarm to imminent, life-threatening danger (Öhman &
Mineka, 2001; Schiller, Levy, Niv, LeDoux, & Phelps, 2008). It involves prior learning that
specific contexts predict imminent adversity (Davis, Walker, Miles, & Grillon, 2010; Grillon,
2007). The onset of fear is rapid and results in a surge of physiological arousal characterized by
a fight-or-flight response, or freezing with active attention (Barlow et al., 1994; Grillon, 2007;
National Institute of Mental Health, 2009; Öhman, 2005; Schiller et al., 2008). The abruptness
of fear responses suggest an absence of conscious processing of the immediate threat (Pêgo,
Sousa, Almeida, & Sousa, 2009). Fear is thought to be adaptive when it is short in duration and
abate upon termination of the threat (Davis, 1998a; Pêgo et al., 2009).
In contrast, anxiety is an emotional state elicited by distant, diffuse, or unspecific
physical or psychological threat (Davis et al., 2010). Among its characteristics are feelings of
tension, discomfort, apprehension, heightened anticipation, avoidance behaviors, and thoughts of
uncontrollability and unpredictability (Barlow, 2002; Pêgo et al., 2009). Although anxiety is less
intense than fear, it tends to last longer (Rennie, 1948). Whereas fear is quick (lasting
milliseconds to seconds), the onset and offset of anxiety is slow, lasting from minutes to hours.
Anxiety is considered adaptive when conscious, cognitive appraisal of threat occurs, and
effective coping is employed. An individual’s experience of anxiety is relative and
individualized: state anxiety and trait anxiety refer to the differences between people in terms of
their tendency to experience anxiety in response to the anticipation of a threat. While state
anxiety describes temporary feelings of anxiety experienced by most people in response to
perceived threat, individuals with trait anxiety experience more intense degrees of state anxiety
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to specific situations, and to a broader range of situations or objects than do most people
(Lazarus, 1991).
Table 2
Summary of Distinctions between Fear/Panic and Anxiety
Fear / Panic
Elicited by actual danger (e.g., presence of a
predator)

Anxiety
Elicited by diffuse, distal, potential, or
symbolic threats

Results in reflexive action or a fight-or-flight
response

Results in general distress, apprehension, risk
assessment behaviors, and avoidance

Triggered by short-lasting, explicit cues or
contexts that predict imminent adversity

Triggered by diffuse, unspecific cues. Driven
by anticipation, and perceptions of
uncontrollability and unpredictability

Short-term state that generally abates upon
termination of the adverse event

Long-term state

Narrows attention and inhibits competing
responses

Increases overall sensory sensitivity towards
confirming threat

Quick onset and offset

Slow onset and offset

Responding to Danger Through Phylogenetic Development
Phylogeny is a proposal of how organisms are related by their evolutionary history.
Herbert Spencer proposed that higher life forms evolved from lower ones, and that human
reasoning and thought evolved from the automatic responses of lower animals (Porges, 2001).
This proposal applies to how we interpret human behavior from animal models that have
encompassed our understanding of the brain’s role in human emotions and behavior over the last
40 years. Inferences about the human brain from animal models stem from a theoretical
assumption in comparative neuroanatomy stating that mammals share a common ancestry and
may have evolved from a common progenitor (Cozolino, 2010).
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From this common ancestry, primitive brain structures found in lower animals were
conserved and later expanded upon in higher animals. Over time, sensory, emotional, and
higher-order cognitive systems evolved together and new functions were integrated with existing
systems (Aggleton, Everitt, Cardinal, & Hall, 2000). Further, according to the theory of
recapitulation, often expressed as ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, the brains of animals go
through stages resembling or representing successive stages in the evolution of their remote
ancestors in developing from embryo to adult.
The Triune Brain Model. MacLean’s Triune Brain Theory (1990) serves as a useful
heuristic to describe the hierarchical fashion in which brain structures involved in fear and
anxiety evolved. MacLean details three distinct layers of the brain that developed in sequence
over phylogenetic evolution from reptiles to humans (MacLean, 1990). These layers reflect the
outward expansion of primitive brain structures found in lower animals (i.e., reptiles) to newer
areas in mammalian species (see Table 3). Conservation of primitive structures is reflected in
anatomical similarities in brains of different species from reptiles to lower mammals and
ultimately to primates and humans.
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Table 3
The Triune Brain
Neural Layer
The Reptilian Brain
(R-complex)

Description and Function
The reptilian brain (R-complex)* is most primitive and innermost layer.
It consists of the brainstem and cerebellum, and controls basic functions
such as heart rate, breathing, body temperature, and balance.

The Limbic System
(Paleomammalian
brain)

The limbic system is the middle layer that emerged in mammals. It is an
interconnected set of brain structures involved in the emotional and
motivational aspects of feeding, reproduction, and parental behavior.
The limbic system is thought to be the seat of unconscious values that
exert a strong influence on behavior.

The Neocortex
(Neomammalian
brain)

The neocortex is the outermost layer and is characterized by two large
cerebral hemispheres. It assumed prominence in primates and
culminated in the human brain. The neocortex is considered to be
flexible, with almost infinite learning abilities. Functions of the
neocortex include sensory perception, generation of motor commands,
and spatial reasoning. Development of human language, abstract and
conscious thought, and imagination emerged with the rise of the
neocortex.

*The reptilian brain has often been misinterpreted as soley representing the brains of reptiles, however, this is not
entirely true. MacLean acknowledged that amphibians (Schumann, Bauman, & Amaral, 2011) and reptiles (Cory,
1999) have homologues or rudimentary elements of a limbic system. Therefore, the term reptilian brain is largely
taxonomic.

Response to immediate physical threat. Survival circuitry inhabiting the spectrum of fear
and anxiety responses may be embedded in the phylogenetic development of the brain from
reptiles to humans. Parts of the reptilian and limbic brain involved in fear and anxiety are shared
by mammals, and are part of an ancient system dedicated to facilitate defenses against predation
(LeDoux, 2012; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). The reptilian brain may have first evolved to respond
to immediate physical threats with reflexive behaviors such as fight-or-flight and freezing
(Porges, 2001). The expansion of the reptilian brainstem to limbic areas reflected an increase in
neural complexity over phylogenetic development, enriching an organism’s behavioral and
affective repertoire (Porges, 2007). By attaching emotional significance to incoming sensory
stimuli, limbic structures aided in perception and memory of meaningful material and the
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coordination of approach-or-avoid responses (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2004). Further,
these connections may have led to associative learning that increased proximal and temporal
space between self and threat enhanced one’s chances of survival (Aggleton et al., 2000).
Among the earliest and most direct sensory-to-emotional connections formed were
between neural fibers of olfactory bulbs and limbic structures. Characterized by close proximity
and dense neural ties that allowed for rapid and efficient transmission of threat-related
information for appraisal and response, this connection was adaptively appropriate as odor
signaled close proximity of a predator (Aggleton et al., 2000; Pêgo et al., 2009). Connections
from limbic structures to the visual cortex further enabled mammals to detect predators from afar
and raise emotional alarms. This may have gave rise to more sophisticated visual abilities such
as rapid discernment of threat from complex visual displays in humans (Öhman & Mineka,
2001). Other structures within the limbic system developed to handle continual internal
monitoring of external threat, providing awareness of self through space and time.
Responding to interpersonal threats. Additional neural connections between the
neocortex and the limbic system may have reflected further improvements in processing more
subtle environmental cues. With the rise of the neocortex, reasoning abilities may have
improved skills for evaluating dangerous situations, and planning on what to do about them,
thereby enhancing predictability and control over one’s environment, and ultimately keeping
threat at a distance.
Neocortical growth has been found to correlate positively with social group size, with
most prominent neocortical growth was seen in the human brain as compared to the brains of
other animals (Bronowski, 2011). The neocortex evolved in part to meet the cognitive demands
of competitive and cooperative relationships. As societies began to develop, the complexity of
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social interactions in larger social groups may have led to increased internal and external
resources to assist with recognizing more subtle interpersonal threats and supports. In many
mammalian species, dominance rank provided a blueprint for social interactions that promoted
self-preservation and reproductive success (Aggleton et al., 2000). In human subjects, activation
of fear and anxiety centers has been observed in conscious and unconscious perception of fearful
faces, in the processing of threatening words and vocalizations, and in the processing of outgroup
versus ingroup facial stimuli (Adolphs, Russell, & Tranel, 1999). Fears and phobias may have
developed as a means to appraise dominant or submissive group members (Öhman & Mineka,
2001).
Neocortical growth may have also been promoted by recognizing that cooperative
relationships helped to promote survival. Beyond the invention of tools and weapons by humans
that helped to procure resources and defend against physical threat, the advent of behavioral
scripts, language, and communal activities (such as hunting) may have reflected refinements in
identifying interpersonal supports that fostered cooperation and limited exposure to threat. The
evolution of culture (i.e., sets of behaviors, rules, and traditions) and social norms may have
increased predictability over physical and social landscapes, thereby enhancing one’s perception
of control and attenuating fear and anxiety. Art and storytelling served to pass on knowledge,
further enhancing predictability of one’s world and fostering anticipation of the future for
generations (Bronowski, 2011). Over time, the recognition of these implicit, social cues
reflected an adaptive advantage for enhancement of emotional perception, memory for
emotionally meaningful material, and refinements in coordination of approach or avoidance
responses (Phan et al., 2004).
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Despite the flourish of the neocortex in primates and humans, the perseveration of early
limbic mechanisms meant that more rudimentary actions (i.e., fight-flight-freezing) often still
take precedence in the face of life-threatening danger. John Hughlings Jackson, in his Principal
of Dissolution, proposed that phylogenetically newer neural circuits generally inhibit more
primitive, phylogenetically older neural circuits. However, “when the higher are suddenly
rendered functionless, the lower rise in activity” (Porges, 2007, p. 7). In the face of lifethreatening circumstances, appraisal of imminent threat and generation of appropriate fear
responses remain unconscious and automatic due to the ancient origin and location of the limbic
system (Öhman & Mineka, 2001) and is relatively impenetrable to higher cortical reasoning
(LeDoux, 1995). As survival continues to depend on involvement of early fear mechanisms, the
handling of life-threatening events continues to rely on a quick process that occurs without
neocortical involvement, and risks false positives rather than false negatives (LeDoux, 1996).
Immediate and Preparatory Systems
The brain is the central organ of stress and adaptation to stress because it perceives and
determines what is threatening, as well as facilitates behavioral and physiological responses to a
stressor (McEwen, Eiland, Hunter, & Miller, 2012). Joseph LeDoux described the biological
underpinnings of fear and anxiety as survival circuits that serve specific adaptive purposes.
Survival circuits are sensory-motor integrative devices that help organisms survive and thrive by
organizing brain functions. These circuits are tuned to detect environmental challenges and
opportunities, and they use this information to control behavioral responses and internal
physiological adjustment that help bring closure to the situation (LeDoux, 2012).
Sympathetic nervous system. The first stage of coping with an acute stressor is
characterized by the activation of the sympathetic nervous system. The sympathetic nervous
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system is comprised of fibers from the spinal cord that go directly to internal organs in the main
cavities of the body (especially those in the abdomen), blood vessels, or return to spinal nerves.
These fibers supply the skin with secretory fibers to sweat glands, motor fibers to smooth muscle
attached to hair follicles, and vasomotor fibers to the blood vessels of the limbs.
The activation of the sympathetic nervous system results in rapid, automatic responses to
danger and produces fear behaviors such as a surge of physiological arousal resulting in a fightor-flight response. During a general alarm reaction, numerous biological systems are activated
to mobilize energy and halt energy storage. Increased functioning in the heart and lungs
facilitate oxygen and glucose delivery, while digestion, growth, reproduction, and inflammatory
and immune responses are suppressed. Cognition is altered simultaneously, with a tendency
towards lowered sensory thresholds (Grillon, 2007). Following abatement of the threat, the
parasympathetic nervous system is activated as a negative feedback response to reinstate the
internal equilibrium of the organism. This is achieved through negative feedback mechanisms
that counteract the reactivity produced by sympathetic activation, and allows the body to return
to a state of homeostasis after experiencing stress (Darnaudéry & Maccari, 2008).
The HPA axis. The hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis (HPA) refers to a complex set of
interactions between the hypothalamus and pituitary glands in the brain, and the adrenal glands
in the kidneys. The HPA axis plays a pivotal role in the stress response and is one of the primary
biological responses to threat (Choi, Evanson, et al., 2007). The HPA is primarily involved the
production of the stress hormones (cortisol in humans, or corticosterone in rats), which affect
stress-related regulation of digestion, autoimmunity, emotions, sexuality, and the storage and
expenditure of energy during stress (Dong & Swanson, 2004b). Models in comparative anatomy
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suggest that the proteins, gene structures, and pathways of the HPA axis were present in the
earliest vertebrates and have been maintained by natural selection (Denver, 2009).
The HPA axis evolved to respond to environmental and psychological threats, with threat
type having differential effects on the HPA. Novel stressors typically activate the HPA axis.
Subsequent exposure to the same, invariant stressor, however, has been found to promote
habituation and the attenuation of the HPA response (Pêgo et al., 2009). An activated HPA also
shows enhanced sensitivity to unpredictable stressors following one episode of HPA activation.
Ohman proposed that sensitization represents time-limited enhanced responsiveness to
evolutionarily relevant fear stimuli when the fear state is already activated (Öhman & Mineka,
2001). Woody and Szechtman (2011) proposed that because security motivation is geared for
the immediate survival needs as well as uncertain future events, it makes adaptive sense to
promote sensitization, where the activation of security motivation by threat enhances the
sensitivity of the system to subsequent instances of potential danger. He further argues that
sensitization is characterized by a memory for the future of potential threat, suggesting that
anticipatory anxiety may be viewed as anxiety stemming from psychogenic stressors. A
sensitized HPA response to psychological stressors may share mechanisms of sensitization to
potential threats in the environment.
The Polyvagal Theory. In his Polyvagal Theory, Stephen Porges proposed several
hierarchical stages that provide insights into the organization and functional nature of
physiological states associated with fear and anxiety. The theory suggests that fear and anxiety
are adaptive responses organized hierarchically along stages of safe, dangerous, or life
threatening events and contexts, with each stage associated with a distinct biological system
(Porges, 2007).
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•

The Social Engagement System represents the highest mode of operation. It is
characterized by a set of mechanisms in the brain that facilitate responses for social
interactions and operate largely in an environment safe from danger. This system is
dominated by the parasympathetic influence.

•

An organism attends to the environment because of novelty or potential threat. When
danger is perceived to be imminent, the mobilization system removes dominant
parasympathetic influences, activating the sympathetic nervous system and fight-or-flight
responses if needed.

•

When danger is life threatening, but fight-or-flight responses are not an option, then the
most primitive sympathetic nervous system activity becomes dominant. The
immobilization system triggers freezing responses such as death feigning and profound
slowing of the heart and breathing (Barlow, 2002).

Neurochemistry of Fear and Anxiety
Neurochemicals consist of neurotransmitters and other molecules that influence the
function of neurons and the networks, or structures, they form. In fear and anxiety processes, the
time scale of actions in which these chemicals operate spans from seconds to hours, with (a) the
rapid effects involving cell excitability while (b) the longer effects involving a genomic signaling
cascade with minutes to hours for completion. When activated by threat, these chemicals
potentiate brain mechanisms that heighten arousal and vigilance, enhance detection and analysis
of threat cues, and facilitate future responding (Woody & Szechtman, 2011).
Norepinephrine. The stress hormone and neurotransmitter, norepinephrine, is produced
in the brainstem. Norepinephrine has an excitatory effect on most of the brain, mediating arousal
and priming the brain’s neurons to be activated by stimuli. During times of stress, the release of
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norepinephrine results in increases in sympathetic discharge and inhibition of parasympathetic
tone. (Ramos & Arnsten, 2007). These actions support physiological elements of the fight-orflight response. The release of norepinephrine increases the rate of contractions in the heart,
triggers the release of glucose from energy stores, and increases blood flow to skeletal muscle
the oxygen supplies to the brain. Increases in norepinephrine have been found to alter cognitive
functions such as attention, motivation, and memory. Although norepinephrine can increase
working memory, an excess may decrease working memory (Ramos & Arnsten, 2007).
Corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH). CRH is a peptide found in cerebrospinal
fluid and released during times of stress. CRH acts on the limbic system and produces a variety
of behavioral and neuroendocrine effects similar to those seen in fear and anxiety. When
circulating, CRH affects changes in heart rate, blood pressure, respiration, gastrointestinal
responses, increases in norepinephrine and epinephrine, increased locomotor activity in a
familiar environment, and decreased locomotor activity in unfamiliar environment (Davis,
1998b).
CRH is implicated in the production of glucocorticoids from HPA axis as well as the
modulation of norepinephrine in the brainstem. CRH is produced in the paraventricular nucleus
of the hypothalamus (PVN), which then induces ACTH release from the anterior pituitary and
subsequent release of glucocorticoids from the adrenal glands (Ramos & Arnsten, 2007). CRH
will feed back to inhibit its production, while feeding to the LC to increase norepinephrine
production. Norepinephrine released from the brainstem will also feed back to inhibit its
production (Aggleton et al., 2000; Benarroch, 2009). Its effects to natural stressors or
conditioned fear can be blocked by CRH antagonists or benzodiazepines (Davis, 1998b).
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Glucocorticoids. Glucocorticoids are a class of corticosteroid known to facilitate
mechanisms that increase energy availability. Glucocorticoids are produced in the adrenal
glands, as part of the HPA Axis and target numerous organ systems that are responsible for a
variety of HPA functions, including energy mobilization and modulation of cardiovascular tone.
Glucocorticoids also exert negative feedback on the HPA axis, thereby limiting its activation
(Choi et al., 2008; Choi, Evanson, et al., 2007; Choi, Furay, et al., 2007; MacLean, 1990). The
actions of CRH precede those of glucocorticoids, with adrenal release of glucocorticoids lagging
minutes behind release of CRH (Droste et al., 2008). The delayed action of glucocorticoids
involves changes in gene transcription and therefore requires more time to process (Sapolsky,
Romero, & Munck, 2000; Schumann et al., 2011).
Two types of glucocorticoids actions are operative in the face of threat. Modulating
actions alter an organism’s response to the stressor that support the immediate physiological
needs of an activated security motivation that include the increase of circulating glucose (the fuel
needed in the brain, muscles, and other cellular works) and inhibition of glucose transport into
storage to elevate circulating glucose. In contrast, preparative actions prime mechanisms that
alter an organism’s response to a subsequent stressor or aid in adapting to a chronic stressor
(Cory, 1999) and require prolonged exposure (minutes to hours) to glucocorticoids and
potentiate sympathetic effects on the cardiovascular system without producing an actual
sympathetic activation. If potential danger does turn into an actual threat, however,
glucocorticoids are readily mobilized because of the prior period of glucocorticoid exposure
(Woody & Szechtman, 2011).
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Neuroanatomy of Fear and Anxiety
The brain consists of billions of neurons that are organized by the principle that neurons
that fire together, wire together, forming networks that manifest into discernable brain regions.
Through phylogenetic development, conservation of primitive brain structures involved in fear
and anxiety reflect lasting imprints on the brain of actions that promoted survival. Animal
models have established that the neuroanatomical foundations and neurocircuitry of anxiety and
fear circuitry are online at birth. These foundations are shaped both genetics and by subsequent
experience.
The complexity of the brain necessitates the raising of several disclaimers. Although
many brain regions are involved in a variety of functions (e.g., stress and also reward),
discussion will be limited to their relationship to fear and anxiety for the purposes of this study.
Further, despite rapid advances in neuroimaging that have allowed for a clearer understanding of
human brain functioning, research in affective neuroscience is still considered to be in its nascent
stages. This is primarily due to limitations in anatomical resolution in neuroimaging that
continue to obscure finer details of neurocircuitry (LeDoux, 2012). With this in mind, animal
studies are still regarded as first-line evidence for detailing structure to function in the human
brain, but continue to pose challenges to hypothesis testing and generalizability to human
populations (Davis et al., 2010).
Brainstem. The brainstem is a primitive network of brain structures involved in
transmitting and processing sensory information from the periphery and motor impulses to
muscles, tissue, and organs. It has been implicated in the reflexive regulation of heart rate,
respiratory control, circulation, arousal and alertness, and consciousness. With regard to fear and
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anxiety, the brainstem acts as a processing center of sensory and motor information between the
brain and the spinal cord.
A number of brainstem regions are implicated in fear and anxiety responses. The locus
coeruleus (LC) is responsible for mediating many of the sympathetic effects involved in stress
and panic. Its role in the stress response is complex and multi-modal, given its far-reaching
projections to the spinal cord, the brainstem, multiple limbic structures, and the neocortex.
The LC is the principal site for brain synthesis of norepinephrine, and its activation has been
implicated in increased arousal, increased vigilance, and increased attention (Davis, Walker, &
Lee, 1997). In states of anxiety, the LC has been proposed to be involved in attentional bias, and
enhanced detection and analysis of threat cues by optimizing scanning of the environment and
shifting attentional focus towards potential threat (Porges, 2001; Woody & Szechtman, 2011).
Other brainstem regions have been implicated in fear and anxiety expressions, although
the explanations for the mechanisms are still evolving. The trigeminal facial motor nucleus is
involved in facial expressions of fear (Davis et al., 1997). Nucleus reticularis and pontis caudalis
are involved in fear-potentiated startle (Aggleton et al., 2000; Davis, 1998a; LeDoux, 1995; Phan
et al., 2004; Porges, 2007). Ventral periaqueductal gray and central gray are involved in freezing
behavior, conflict test, conditioned emotional response, social interaction, and hypoalgesia
(Öhman & Mineka, 2001). In more extreme expressions of fear, the parabrachial nucleus is
involved in panting and respiratory distress. The dorsal motor nucleus of vagus and nucleus
ambiguus are involved in parasympathetic effects that include ulcers, urination, defecation, and
bradycardia (Davis, 1992, 1997).
Limbic structures. The limbic system is believed to be the center of emotional
processing and is often described as the emotional brain. In fear and anxiety, limbic structures
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are involved in the processing of threat salience, determination and relay of appropriate
responses (i.e., fear or anxiety), as well as continued monitoring of the environment for threat.
While much focus of the brain’s role in fear and anxiety has centered on the amygdala,
developments in neuroscience have allowed for increased specificity in detailing structure to
function of limbic regions and how they facilitate fear or anxiety responses.
The thalamus. The thalamus is a limbic structure that serves as a processing center and
relay station of sensory information between different subcortical areas and the cerebral cortex.
The thalamus receives information from nearly sensory organ, with each sensory system
including a thalamic nucleus. Sensory information related to threat is relayed from the thalamus
to the sensory cortex, comprised of the visual cortex on the occipital lobes, the auditory cortex on
the temporal lobes, the primary olfactory cortex in the temporal lobes, the gustatory cortex on the
insular lobe, and the primary somatosensory cortex on the anterior parietal lobes. In addition,
each of the primary sensory relay areas receives strong feedback connections from the cerebral
cortex.
Of note, unlike other structures that go through the thalamic relay station, the sense of
smell is unique. Although the olfactory bulbs receive sensory input from the olfactory nerves
and route those signals throughout the brain, not all olfactory information is routed to the
olfactory cortex. Some neural fibers are routed directly to limbic structures. Dense neural ties
and close proximity between these structures allowed for rapid and efficient transmission of
threat-related information for appraisal and response (Barton & Aggleton, 2000; Öhman &
Mineka, 2001; Pêgo et al., 2009).
The amygdala. The amygdala is an ancient, almond-shaped cell mass shared by many
higher and lower species that is widely regarded as one of the most important structures in
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emotion (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). During the embryogenesis of rodents, the amygdala is
online by the eighth month of gestation (Cozolino, 2006). Its early appearance in the
mammalian brain both through evolution and embryogenesis suggest a primary role in survival.
The amygdala is located deep within the limbic system on both sides of the cerebral
hemispheres. The right amygdala appears to be involved in emotional arousal below the level of
awareness, whereas consciously perceived stimuli activate the left (Phan et al., 2004). Further,
the amygdala is activated by both reward- or stress-related stimuli and has been proposed as an
important structure in the detection of stimuli relevance (Davis & Whalen, 2001; Sander,
Grafman, & Zalla, 2011).
Activation of the amygdala results in behavioral signs of fear and anxiety (Bronowski,
2011; Davis, 1998a; see Table 4). Animal studies using fear conditioning have determined its
involvement in the detection and appraisal of threat, generation of fear-related emotions, and
coordination of appropriate responses (Cozolino, 2006; Phan et al., 2004). In human subjects,
amygdala activation has been observed in conscious and unconscious perception of fearful faces,
processing of threatening words and vocalizations, and in the processing of outgroup versus
ingroup facial stimuli. Damage to the amygdala in different animal species impairs emotional
reactions of several sensory modalities, and in humans has been found to impair visual
recognition of emotion in facial expressions (Adolphs et al., 1999).
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Table 4
Functions of the Amygdala
Function
Direct electrical stimulation of the amygdala produces behaviors associated with fear

Source
(Davis et al., 1997;
LeDoux, 1996)

Lesions of areas to which the central amygdala projects interfere with individual fear
responses such as blood pressure changes, freezing behavior, or hormonal release.

(LeDoux, 2003; 2012)

Lesions to amygdala blocked fear-potentiated startle

(Davis et al., 1997; Grillon,
2007)
(Liang et al., 1992)

CRH injected intracisternally (through the cerebral ventricles) resulted in excitatory
effect on acoustic startle. Lesions to the central nucleus of the amygdala block effects
of CRH on acoustic startle reflex (pathway) when CRH was injected.
Acid lesions of the amygdala blocked the acquisition of fear-potentiated startle, but
not its retention or expression

(Antoniadis, Winslow,
Davis, & Amaral, 2007)

Although the amygdala is often discussed in the clinical literature as a whole, unilateral
structure, ablasion and chemical lesion studies in animal models have parsed out the specific
functions of its subregions. These subregions are highly connected to regions of the cortex, basal
forebrain, thalamus, and brainstem, and possess specific connective parts that operate and control
different mechanisms (Davis, 1997; Davis & Whalen, 2001). Three areas have been implicated
in the acquisition of threat signals, storage and retrieval of implicit fear memories, and evaluation
of threat salience to determine whether to employ fear or anxiety responses:
1. The basolateral amygdala (composed of the lateral and basolateral nuclei of the
amygdala) is proposed to assign affective value to incoming or perceived threat cues.
Salience of threat (e.g., whether it is immediate or distant) determines whether or not it
requires an immediate response. The basolateral amygdala is known to have extensive
connections going to the neocortex (Davis et al., 1997). Although pathways that connect
the amygdala with the cortex provide a channel of communication between cognition and
emotion, these connections are not symmetrical. Projections from the cortex to the
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amygdala are considerably weaker than those from the amygdala to the cortex, and may
explain why strong emotions are difficult to deactivate (LeDoux, 1995; Pêgo et al.,
2009).
2. The lateral nucleus of the amygdala is a critical anatomical structure in the consolidation
of conditioned fear memories. The lCeA (see below) has been proposed to be the site of
fear memory storage (H. Li et al., 2013). Together, the LA-lCeA circuit work in a series
in conditioned fear memory that incur a reflexive, defensive response (LeDoux, 1995;
Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Schafe, Doyère, & LeDoux, 2005).
3. The central nucleus (CeA) is the primary output to the brainstem areas that control the
autonomic nervous system and fight-flight responses (see Table 5). Recent studies have
highlighted the CeA’s greater role in responding to fear-conditioned-to-cue stimuli as
compared to contextual stimuli, suggesting its greater involvement in fear as compared to
anxiety (Davis et al., 2010; Pêgo et al., 2008; Porges, 2007; Woody & Szechtman, 2011).
Its connections to the periaqueductal gray region in the brainstem modulate freezing or
immobility. Its connections with the PVN control endocrine responses of the HPA axis
(LeDoux, 1995). Its influence on the HPA axis, however, is considered to be limited
(Graeff, 2007). While limbic regions such as the amygdala, influence HPA axis
responses to stress, most of these limbic regions have limited to no direct projections to
PVN, and instead use connections through intervening structures (Choi, Evanson, et al.,
2007).
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Table 5
CeA Targets and Physiological Responses
Target
Lateral hypothalamus

Physiological Response
Sympathetic autonomic responses:
tachycardia, galvanic skin response,
paleness, pupil dilation, blood pressure
elevation
Fear-induced bradycardia in rabbits

Reference
LeDoux, 1996
Davis, 1997
Ohman & Mineka,
2001

Dorsal motor nucleus of vagus
Nucleus ambiguus

Ulcers, urination, defecation,
bradycardia

Davis, 1997

Parabrachial nucleus

Panting, respiratory distress

Davis, 1997

Ventral tegmental area
Locus coeruleus
Lateral dorsal tegmental nucleus
Basal forebrain

Arousal, increased vigilance, increased
attention

Davis, 1997

Nucleus reticularis pontis caudalis

Fear-potentiated startle

LeDoux, 1996
Davis, 1998

Ventral periaqueductal gray in midbrain
Central gray

Freezing behavior, conflict test,
conditioned emotional response, social
interaction, hypoalgesia

Ohman & Mineka,
2001; LeDoux, 1996;
Davis, 1997

Trigeminal facial motor nucleus

Facial expressions of fear

Davis, 1997

Paraventricular nucleus (Hypothalamus)

Corticosteroid release (“stress
response”)

Davis, 1997

Bed nucleus of the stria terminalis

Neuroendocrine responses

LeDoux, 1996

The bed nucleus of the stria terminalis. The bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (BNST)
is a cell mass that forms a distinct region in the basal or non-cortical division of the cerebral
hemisphere (Davis, 1998b; Dong, Petrovich, & Swanson, 2001). The BNST lies close in
proximity to the amygdala, on the opposite side of the stria terminalis (Fudge & Haber, 2001).
In rodents, the bulk of the BNST neurons are among the earliest born in the cerebral hemispheres
(Dong et al., 2001).
Like the amygdala, subdomains of the BNST are highly connected to different parts of
the brain, with afferent connections to regions in the cerebral cortex, rostral forebrain, thalamus,
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hypothalamus (see Table 6), and brainstem. They similarly operate different mechanisms
activated by both stress- and reward-related stimuli (Davis, 1998b; Fudge & Haber, 2001) and
have been implicated in hunger, salt and water intake, stress, arousal, and reward (Shin,
Geerling, & Loewy, 2008).
While the amygdala plays a key role in fear-conditioned-to-cue stimuli, the bed nucleus
of stria terminalis (BNST) is implicated in anxiety behavior and responses to contextual stimuli
(Pêgo et al., 2008). Electrical stimulation of BNST in rats produced stress-like behavior that was
qualitatively similar to the behavior produced by restraint stress but differed in time course – the
effects lasting longer (Casada & Dafny, 2010).
Table 6
Hypothalamic Targets and Functions
Hypothalamic Targets
LeDoux, 1996;
Davis, 1997;
Ohman & Mineka, 2001

Lateral hypothalamus

Sympathetic autonomic responses:
increased heart rate, galvanic skin
response, paleness, pupil dilation, blood
pressure elevation, fear-induced
bradycardia

Davis, 1997

Paraventricular nucleus

Corticosteroid release

While limbic regions, such as the amygdala and hippocampus, influence HPA axis
responses to stress, most of these limbic regions have limited to no direct projections to PVN,
and instead use bisynaptic or multisynaptic connections through intervening structures (Choi,
Evanson, et al., 2007; Radley, Williams, & Sawchenko, 2008). Numerous lines of evidence
suggest that the BNST is well positioned to relay limbic information to the neuroendocrine
system (Choi, Furay, et al., 2007; Crestani et al., 2013). Rodent models reveal that the BNST is
connected extensively to the neuroendocrine system through its various subregions (see

26
Appendix: Connectivity of the BNST). The lateral anterior BNST sends projections to
hypothalamic areas guiding autonomic and energy homeostasis and feeding behavior, whereas
the posterior BNST projects to hypothalamic areas responsible for reproductive and defensive
behaviors (Davis et al., 1997; Dong & Swanson, 2004a). The dorsalmedial division of the BNST
generates the densest known inputs to the neuroendocrine system via the paraventricular nucleus
(PVN) of the hypothalamus than any part of the cerebral hemispheres (Dong & Swanson,
2005b).
This connectivity suggests a primary role in the production and modulation of the HPA
axis. By integrating the output of different stress-related brain networks, the BNST and PVN
play a key role in the HPA stress response. The BNST is activated early after the arrival of
stressful stimuli, resulting in the secretion of the adrenocorticotrophic hormone (ACTH), CRH,
and arginine-vasopressin in the PVN. In turn, ACTH stimulates the synthesis and secretion of
glucocorticoids by the adrenal glands (see Figure 1; Davis et al., 1997; Pêgo et al., 2009).

Figure 1. BNST to HPA production of cortisol.
The functional subdomains of the BNST play different roles in integrating and processing
limbic information in response to stress and further suggest that excitatory as well as inhibitory
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limbic information is funneled through these cell groups (Choi, Furay, et al., 2007). The
anteroventral BNST appears to stimulate the HPA axis during acute stress, whereas the posterior
BNST appears to be involved in its inhibition (Choi, Evanson, et al., 2007).
The excitatory and inhibitory effects of the BNST over the PVN ultimately impact the
modulation of stress hormones. In rats, stimulation of the medial and rostral areas of the BNST
resulted in a 24% increase in plasma corticosterone levels and a 36% increase 30-minutes poststimulation. In contrast, stimulation of the lateral BNST resulted in 13% decrease in plasma
corticosterone levels and a 22% decrease in levels 15-minutes post-stimulation (Dunn, 1987).
Further, inhibitory influences of the BNST, such as the heart rate decreases following evoked
restraint stress in rats, are a result of parasympathetic activation (Crestani, Alves, Tavares, &
Corrêa, 2009; Öhman & Mineka, 2001).
Rodent models have shown that high-frequency stimulation of the BNST (simulating
invariant, homotypic stress) has been found to decrease the size of the BNST (Pêgo et al., 2008),
which in turn produces rapid and enduring depression of PVN responses. Through enhancement
of inhibitory control from the BNST, this decreased responsiveness of neurons in or around the
PVN may participate in of the HPA axis tolerance to repeated homotypic stress, which may
suggest that habituation is occurring (Tartar, King, & Devine, 2006).
The hippocampus. The hippocampus is a limbic structure that plays a central role in
learning and memory. It is involved in the processing of explicit and declarative memories, in
contrast to the processing of implicit memories in the lateral amygdala. During periods of
intense stress, threat cues activate the amygdala, which in turn triggers the production of
glucocorticoids from the adrenal gland. These hormones modulate the strength of declarative
memories formed in the hippocampus. In intense fear reactions, formation of conscious
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memories (e.g., declarative and spatial) is impaired, whereas the ability to form unconscious
(e.g., procedural or implicit) memories remains intact (LeDoux & Phelps, 2011).
The hippocampus is rich with receptors for CRH and glucocorticoids and is involved in
regulating the release of glucocorticoids in response to environmental and psychogenic stressors
(Woody & Szechtman, 2011). Both subtypes of CRH and glucocorticoid receptors are present in
the hippocampus, as are both subtypes of receptors for glucocorticoids, with the two subtypes of
each receptor often mediating functionally opposite effects. Differences in receptor subtypes and
times of action of CRH and glucocorticoids in the hippocampus may serve different aspects of
threat responding. One function may involve the envisioning future events by probing for
possible danger that involves the creation of mental scenarios in which vague signs materialize
as real threat and facilitating predictions about upcoming events. Another function is feedback
inhibition of the HPA response where circulating glucocorticoids act on the hippocampus to limit
or terminate HPA activation (Woody & Szechtman, 2011).
The insula. The insula is a limbic structure involved in evaluative, experiential, and
expressive aspects of emotions. In fear and anxiety, the insula serves as an alarm center for
internally sensed dangers to changes in the environment. It integrates information between
somatic internal feelings and external cues, which is believed to be adaptive by providing
internal awareness of the physical self across time to guide behavioral responses.
The insula receives integrated sensory information of the environment from various
regions of the thalamus. The posterior insula connects reciprocally with the secondary
somatosensory cortex and receives input from the ventral posterior inferior thalamic nuclei. This
region also receives inputs from the ventromedial nucleus of the thalamus, which conveys
homeostatic information such as pain, temperature, itch, local oxygen status, and touch. In
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addition, a human imaging study revealed that the anterior insula is interconnected to regions in
the temporal and occipital lobe, opercular and orbitofrontal cortex, and triangular and opercular
parts of the inferior frontal gyrus (Phan et al., 2004).
Its emotional functions are suggested by its extensive connectivity to both the amygdala
and BNST. In rhesus monkeys, widespread reciprocal connections bridge the insula and almost
all subnuclei of the amygdala, with a particularly large input from the CeA. Through these
shared connections, it is suggested that the insula relays internal, somatically sensed information
to the amygdala where appropriate responses to danger are determined (Phan et al., 2004).
In highly anxious people, hypervigilant threat monitoring is a key symptom underlying
many anxiety disorders. Together with the BNST, the insula appears to play a critical role in
maintaining hypervigilance. In human subjects with elevated anxiety, the BNST showed greater
overall recruitment and exaggerated tracking of threat proximity. The insular cortex tracked
threat proximity, exhibited exaggerated responses in individuals with greater anxiety, and
showed enhanced recruitment when threat proximity was controllable. Activity in the BNST and
insula continuously monitored changes in environmental threat level and underlied hypervigilant
threat-monitoring processes in more highly trait anxious individuals (Somerville, Whalen, &
Kelley, 2010).
The hypothalamus. Located at the base of the brain, the hypothalamus is a coordinating
center for the motor control of visceral activity. One of its many functions is the regulation of
body temperature. In the stress response, the hypothalamus is the gateway to the hypothalamicpituitary-axis involved in the production of the stress hormone, cortisol. The hypothalamus has
connections with the pituitary gland by virtue of which it influences the pituitary and, through

30
the pituitary gland, the other endocrine glands. The hypothalamus also sends nerve fibers to
lower centers in the brainstem.
The anterior cingulate. The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) plays a role in the
experiential aspects of emotion. It serves as a relay area of cognitive and emotional information,
facilitating top-down organization of emotional information. It is involved in assessing the
salience of emotion and motivational information and appears to be especially involved in early
learning and problem-solving. Cerebral blood flow from human PET studies suggest a key role
in determining speed reaction in behavioral tasks (Fuchs & Flügge, 2003). It has also been
implicated in motivation for decisions and producing gut reactions (Cozolino, 2010). The
posterior dorsal ACC is responsible for response selection, whereas the anterior dorsal ACC is
involved in evaluation of the response. Activity in this region has been shown to increase when
uncertainty is higher (Banich, 2009).
The ACC is broadly described as belonging to the limbic lobe given its expansive
connections to subcortical structures (Fuchs & Flügge, 2003; Phan et al., 2004). It has extensive
connections with multiple brain structures, including the hypothalamus, amygdala, and brain
stem and is part of a system that orchestrates the autonomic, neuroendocrine, visceral, and
behavioral expression of emotion (van der Kolk, 2006). Activity in the ACC has been shown to
be modulated by incoming sensory information from the thalamus as well as feedback from
defensive responses produced by the brainstem that seek to change the condition of the
environment (Fuchs & Flügge, 2003).
Connections from rostral and ventral areas of the ACC to the amygdala are proposed to
serve emotional functions (Fuchs & Flügge, 2003). Damage to the ACC has been found to result
in emotional disturbances including apathy and emotional instability (Phan et al., 2004). Dorsal
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areas of the ACC appear to serve cognitive functions as evidenced by widespread connections
with the prefrontal corticies. These subcortical and cortical links make it a central station for
processing top-down and bottom-up stimuli and assigning appropriate control to other areas in
the brain (Phan et al., 2004).
Neocortical structures. To review, the neocortex is the outermost layer of the triune
brain that assumed prominence in primates and humans. In humans, the development of
language, abstract and conscious thought, and imagination are believed to have emerged with the
rise of the neocortex. The neocortex is considered to be flexible and possesses infinite learning
abilities. Functions of the neocortex include learning motor sequences and generation of motor
commands. In fear and anxiety, several key structures in the frontal regions of the neocortex are
involved in emotional inhibition. Working in tandem with key limbic, these frontal areas are
involved in different elements of conscious processing: integrating and organizing sensory and
temporal experience, spatial reasoning, organizing working memory, directing attention, and
memory for the future. The addition of conscious processing provides context in the
interpretation of fear stimuli, inhibits limbic expression of fear and anxiety responses, and
organizes and guides behavioral responses.
Orbitomedial prefrontal cortex. The orbitomedial prefrontal cortex (OMPFC) is a broad
designation for the orbital and the medial prefrontal cortices that evolve during childhood
(Cozolino, 2010). Animal models reveal that the OMPFC plays a role in emotional inhibition by
serving as a modulator of intense emotional responses, especially conditioned fear responses
generated by the amygdala (Phan et al., 2004). Electrical stimulation of mPFC has been found to
reduce conditioned fear in a temporally specific manner in rats (Quirk, Garcia, & GonzálezLima, 2006). The mPFC plays a role in the extinction of conditioned fear responses by
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inhibiting the limbic system, thereby regulating the generalization of fearful behavior (by
attenuating sympathetic and hormonal responses to stress) and the stress hormone cortisol (by
suppressing the stress response mediated by the HPA axis; van der Kolk, 2006).
The infralimbic cortex (IL) is a cortical region in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
which is important in tonic inhibition of subcortical structures and emotional responses, such as
fear. Emotional arousal, particularly fear, strengthens memory for the threating context.
Mueller, Porter, and Quirk (2008) suggested that NE released in IL during the extinction of a fear
response activates a molecular cascade that strengthens extinction memory. The emotional
arousal evoked by conditioned fear paradoxically promotes the subsequent extinction of that
fear, thereby ensuring behavioral flexibility (also see Fear Extinction Pathway).
The OMPFC, along with the hippocampus, however, is also involved in the spontaneous
recovery of previously extinguished fear stimuli. During extinction recall in human subjects,
functional connectivity analysis revealed significant activations in the ventral OMPFC and
hippocampus in response to extinguished versus unextinguished fearful stimuli. Activation in
these brain regions was positively correlated with the magnitude of extinction memory (Milad et
al., 2007).
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is involved
with directing attention, organizing working memory, learning motor sequences and organizing
temporal experience, memory for the future, and integration of senses, the body, and memory to
organize and guide behavior (Cozolino, 2010). Banich (2009) proposed the Cascade of Control
model that involves a sequence of brain regions that maintain attention in order to arrive at a
goal. The model assumes the top-down involvement of the posterior DLPFC, the mid-DLPFC,
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and the posterior and anterior dorsal ACC. The activity of any of the areas involved in this
model depends on the efficiency of the areas that came before it.
1. The posterior DLPFC creates an appropriate attentional set of rules for the brain to
accomplish the current goal.
2. The mid-DLPFC selects the representation that will fulfill the goal. The task-relevant
information must be separated from other sources of information in the task.
3. The posterior dorsal ACC is responsible for response selection.
4. Following the response, the anterior dorsal ACC is involved in response evaluation,
deciding whether one was correct or incorrect. Activity in the ACC increases when the
probability of an error is higher. If the DLPFC imposes a great deal of control on the
response, the ACC will require less activity (Banich, 2009).
Parietal lobe. The parietal lobe is thought to be involved in awareness of self through
time and space (Cozolino, 2010). The regions of the parietal lobes access information from the
sensory cortex, an umbrella term for the primary and secondary cortices of the different senses:
the visual cortex on the occipital lobes, the auditory cortex on the temporal lobes, the primary
olfactory cortex on the temporal lobes, the gustatory cortex on the insular lobe, and the primary
somatosensory cortex on the anterior parietal lobes. Within the anterior parietal lobe lies the
primary somatosensory cortex, which is involved in somatic sensation, visual stimuli, and
movement planning. Posterior to the primary somatosensory cortex lies the somatosensory
association cortex, which integrates sensory information from the primary somatosensory cortex
to construct an understanding of the object being felt (van der Kolk, 2006).
The paralimbic cortex. The paralimbic cortex, or basal forebrain, is interposed between
the neocortex and the region encompassing the hippocampus and olfactory system, or the
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allocortex. The paralimbic cortex lies close to, and is directly connected with, the structures of
the limbic system, including the amygdala, the hippocampus, anterior superior temporal gyrus,
and the cingulate cortex. At the apex of the paralimbic cortex sits the OMPFC. Extensive
connections link the OMPFC to core limbic structures, particularly the amygdala, and provide a
gradual transition from primary limbic regions to higher neocortical regions. Many structures
within the paralimbic system contain receptors for CRH and glucocorticoids and are implicated
in regulating the HPA axis response to environmental and psychogenic stressors, and are also
subject to regulation by an activated HPA (Woody & Szechtman, 2011).
The paralimbic cortex is an interactive zone between affective and cognitive processing.
It is believed to be involved in emotional aspects of goal-directed behavior, motivation, and selfcontrol. It is thought that the emotional experiences that humans perceive such as fear, anger,
and pleasure reflect an interplay between the specific subcortical limbic regions and the higher
brain centers that make up the paralimbic cortex (Fuchs & Flügge, 2003).
Fear and Anxiety Circuitry
Merriam-Webster’s Medical Dictionary defines circuitry as “the network of
interconnected neurons in the nervous system and especially the brain” or “the neuronal
pathways of the brain along which electrical and chemical signals travel” (“Circuitry,” n.d., para.
6). Generation and modulation of emotions may be broadly characterzied as being top-down or
bottom-up. Bottom up-processes stem from our sensory perceptions of the environment, or in
response to inherently emotional perceptual properties of a stimulus. Top-down processes are
driven by cognitive appraisals of an event, and modulate our emotional responses such as fear
and anxiety (McRae, Misra, Prasad, Pereira, & Gross, 2012).
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An fMRI study on 20 human female subjects revealed that bottom-up responses activated
systems for attending to and encoding perceptual and affective stimulus properties, whereas topdown responses activated prefrontal regions that facilitate high-level cognitive interpretations.
Self-reported affect also correlated with activity in the amygdala during bottom-up responding
and with activity in the medial prefrontal cortex during top-down responding. Athough bottomup and top-down responses activated the amygdala, bottom-up responses did so more strongly
(Ochsner et al., 2009).
The high road and the low road: LeDoux. LeDoux (1996) outlined a pathway from the
acquisition of a stimulus to emotional response and highlighted the prominent role of the
amygdala in the fear conditioning. He described two amygdala pathways in rodent brains that
lead to the expression of fear and anxiety: the high road and low road. The low road is a fast
pathway in which a signal from a threat stimulus (perceived as life-threatening) is transmitted to
the thalamus and then to the amygdala, which then activates a fear response. The low road is
regarded as a more primitive mechanism of defense, evolving from lesser-developed animals that
have not evolved a more complex part of the brain. It only involves the subcortical part of the
brain and is believed to work without conscious experience of the stimulus. The high road is a
slower road that is includes the cortical parts of the brain and is dedicated to non-life-threatening
stimuli. Threat signals from a host of senses are integrated in the thalamus and relayed to the
sensory cortex, which creates a conscious impression of the stimulus. Impressions made by the
sensory cortex are then routed to the amygdala, where appropriate fear and anxiety responses are
determined. In more developed animals, the high road and the low road work simultaneously to
provide both the fear response and perceptual feedback (see Figure 2; LeDoux, 1996).
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Figure 2. LeDoux (1996) – The high road vs. the low road.
Differential involvement of the CeA and BNST. For many years in the clinical
literature, it was widely accepted that the amygdala was the most important structure in fear and
anxiety. The work of Joseph LeDoux suggested that in the brain, fear and anxiety responses are
relayed by neuroendocrine and autonomic centers that comprise largely the same pathways as
those activated by anxiety, resulting in wide phenotypic overlap (Pêgo et al., 2009).
The work of Michael Davis and his colleagues, however, has shed some light on where
fear and anxiety diverge in the brain. Davis (1997) posited that although the mechanisms of fear
and anxiety are intricately linked phenotypically and have some overlap in neural pathways, they
are indeed separate (Davis et al., 1997). Mapping studies implicated both the CeA and the
BNST, and suggested that fear and anxiety:
•

Are activated in response to particular stimuli: Davis and his colleagues found that the
within the amygdala, the CeA is activated by stimulus specific threat (i.e., shock). In
contrast, contextual threat cues (e.g., rats being exposed to a light for several minutes)
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activate the BNST, which in turn activates the hypothalamic and brainstem areas
involved in specific signs of anxiety (Pêgo et al., 2009).
•

Are activated over different timeframes: The BNST was found to be involved in
elevations of the startle response that lasted longer than the startle response observed in
the CeA during explicit cue conditioning (Davis et al., 1997; Walker & Davis, 1997b).

•

Resulted in the activation of distinct centers in the brain: Lesions to the rat BNST did not
block fear-potentiated startle, whereas lesions to the CeA did not block light-enhanced
startle, a paradigm used to measure anxiety (See review of CeA and BNST lesion and
CRH studies; Walker, Miles, & Davis, 2009).
Davis proposed that the BNST may be a system that responds to threat signals more

similar to anxiety than to fear, whereas the CeA is clearly involved in fear and not as much in
anxiety. Assuming that phasic activation is like fear, whereas sustained activation of similar
structures is like anxiety, this would suggest differential roles of the amygdala and the BNST in
fear and anxiety, respectively (Davis, 1998b; Davis et al., 1997). The authors summarized:
Fear and anxiety appear as two phenomenologically and anatomically dissociable
response systems. One, which includes as an integral component the bed nucleus of the
stria terminalis, can be characterized as a sluggish response system that once activated
continues to influence behavior long after the initiating stimulus has been terminated.
The other system, which includes the central nucleus of the amygdala, can be
characterized as a rapid response system that mediates short-term responses to specific
threat cues (i.e., stimulus-specific fear responses). We refer to the former, sustained type
of response as anxiety, and to the latter stimulus-specific, short-lasting type of response
as fear. (Walker, Toufexis, & Davis, 2003, p. 204)
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Other studies appear to support Davis’s theory. In response to exposure to chronic
unpredictable stress, the morphology of the amygdala was preserved in contrast to significant
level of plasticity in the BNST, suggesting chronic stress does not produce changes in fearacquisition (Pêgo et al., 2008). In a review of imaging studies on specific anxiety disorders,
Engel revealed a brain-based distinction between two classes of anxiety disorders – those
involving intense fear and panic, and those involving excessive worry and rumination (Engel,
Bandelow, Gruber, & Wedekind, 2008). Graeff (2007) also acknowledged that anxiety and
panic seem to be qualitatively different emotional states that are related to two types of defense
reaction to potential and proximal threat, respectively. Their related pathologies, GAD and panic
disorder were found to promote differential mobilization of the HPA and sympathetic nervous
system. Specifically while anxiety activated both the HPA and the sympatho-adrenal axes, panic
attacks cause major sympathetic activation, but have little effect on the HPA axis (Graeff, 2007).
Fear pathway. Based on the findings of the differential involvement of the CeA and
BNST in fear and anxiety, coupled with his own mapping studies, Davis (2001) proposed that
the basolateral amygdala to CeA connection, along with the efferent projections of the CeA to
brainstem and hypothalamic targets, appear to represent a system involved specifically in the
acquisition and expression of conditioned fear (see Appendix: Mapping the Neural Pathway of
Fear).
In the processing of fear, signals from a host of sensory modalities mediated by cortical,
forebrain, thalamic, and brainstem regions converge in the basolateral amygdala. Signals are
then sent to CeA, where determinations of appropriate response are made, and relayed to
brainstem targets and hypothalamic targets (Davis & Whalen, 2001). Choi, Furay, et al. (2007)
found that the CeA has limited connectivity and influence on hypothalamic targets, and more
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profound influence on the brainstem, highlighting its greater involvement in sympathetic
activation (Choi, Furay, et al., 2007; Graeff, 2007).

Figure 3. Fear pathway.
Anxiety pathway. In contrast to the pathway of fear responses, Davis’s (2001) theory
suggests that the basolateral amygdala to BNST connection, along with the BNST efferent
projections to predominantly hypothalamic targets appear to represent a system involved in the
anxiety. Because the CeA includes CRH-enriched neurons that project to BNST, phasic
activation of the CeA (specifically the lateral division) by diffuse, unspecific stressors could lead
to long-term activation of the BNST through CRH, which is released during periods of stress and
preferentially activates the BNST (Davis & Whalen, 2001; Walker et al., 2009).
This assertion that CRH from the amygdala feeds into the BNST was substantiated by the
work of Shepard, Schulkin, and Myers (2006), who found that when rats were exposed to an
elevated plus maze (a measure of anxiety-like behavior), elevated corticosterone in the
amygdalae of rats increased CRH levels in the dorsolateral BNST. Chronically elevated
corticosterone in the dorsolateral BNST led to reduced exploratory behavior on the elevated plus
maze, indicating an increase in anxiety-like behavior (Shepard, Chambers, Busch, Mount, &
Schulkin, 2009).
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To review and highlight the difference between the pathways proposed by Davis and his
colleagues, characteristics of the fear response are similar to the quick responding of the
sympathetic nervous system functioning, in that threat is processed very quickly, and responses
are generally short lived. In contrast, the protracted nature of anxiety is similar to that of
neuroendocrine functioning. Both are slow to initiate and prolonged in their response, which last
anywhere from minutes to hours. As mentioned previously, the BNST has much more robust
projections to the HPA as compared to the CeA. In contrast, as compared to the BNST, the CeA
has much more robust projections to the brainstem.

Slow Track / Distal Threat
BNST

BLA

Thalamus

Hypothalamus
---------Brainstem

Anxiety

Figure 4. Anxiety pathway.
Development of Fear and Anxiety Disorders
Effective coping to stress implies the triggering of necessary responses and the
termination of these responses when they are no longer needed. In contrast, pathologies of fear
and anxiety imply that these typically adaptive responses outlast their exposure to threat and
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result in prolonged activation of the neural substrates and processes that regulate them. The
exaggeration or protraction of stress responses can lead to changes in the brain and immune
system that may ultimately result in disease (Pêgo et al., 2009). From the perspective of
homeostasis, prolonged and/or uncontrollable stress can devastate an organism, leading to the
suppression of anabolic processes, depletion of energy stores, immunno-suppression, and
exhaustion (Sapolsky, 1992). McEwen describes this as allostatic load (McEwen & Gianaros,
2010), which refers to “the price the tissue or organ pays for an inefficiently managed allostatic
response” or the ‘cost of adaptation’” (Darnaudéry & Maccari, 2008)(p. 573).
Family inheritance of anxiety disorders have shown a strong influence of genetic
background and familial aggregation for specific phobias and unspecific anxiety disorders.
Despite a strong genetic contribution, part of the variability could be explained by family and
other environmental factors. Both animal and humans studies reveal that traumatic events or
emotional stressors in early life constitute a developmental risk factor for pathologies of anxiety
and fear in adulthood (Pêgo et al., 2009).
A number of studies have highlighted the consequential biological impacts of
environmental adversities due to prolonged stress responses. These studies center on
developmental and lifespan risk factors including the effects of prenatal stress, adverse early-life
experience, and lifespan issues that lead to HPA dysregulation, genetic modification, as well as
remodeling of brain structures that correlate with fear and anxiety disorders (Pêgo et al., 2009).
Environmental adversity and HPA dysregulation. Anxiety patients show a wide
spectrum of patterns of HPA activity which reflects the heterogeneous nature of anxiety
disorders. The effects of chronic stress have been modeled extensively in animals and has been
found to be a powerful modulator of emotional behavior. These studies indicate that substantial

42
stress exposure can produce changes in responsiveness of the HPA axis. Animal studies have
demonstrated altered reactivity of the HPA axis in gestation, early childhood, and throughout the
lifespan due to adverse early-life experiences (Pêgo et al., 2009). These changes appear to
reflect increased reactivity to potential threat as well as HPA dysfunctions in later life that may
predispose an individual toward the development of certain kinds of psychopathology (Woody &
Szechtman, 2011).
Gestational stress in rats has been found to have long-lasting effects on the HPA axis,
with chronic hyperactivation of the HPA response associated with an altered circadian rhythm of
corticosterone secretion in rats. Female rats exposed to prenatal restraint stress exhibited blunted
corticosterone secretion response to stress following an inescapable foot shock. In male rats,
sleep disturbances and HPA dysfunctions were observed in infant, young, adult and aged
animals, suggesting a permanent effect of early stress. Both male and female offspring later
exhibited behavioral disturbances including high levels of anxiety and depression-like behavior
during adulthood, as well as cognitive deficits including memory impairments (Darnaudéry &
Maccari, 2008). Life events occurring during the perinatal period (i.e., the period immediately
before and immediately after birth) as well as maternal separation stress have also been linked to
profound, long-term dysregulation of the HPA axis and increased anxiety-like behavior that
appears to be established during restricted windows of time when the HPA axis seems
particularly vulnerable to stress (Darnaudéry & Maccari, 2008; Pêgo et al., 2009).
Despite the permanent imprinting induced by early stress, HPA dysfunctions can be
reversed by environmental enrichment or pharmacology (Darnaudéry & Maccari, 2008). An
established example of the consequences of early-life experience-induced programming includes
the effects of maternal care, where patterns of augmented maternal care result in decreased
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neuroendocrine stress responses, improved cognition and resilience to depression in the
recipients of this care (Korosi & Baram, 2010). Alterations in maternal behavior make a strong
contribution to the long-term effects of prenatal restraint stress in rats, through epigenetic
mechanisms (Darnaudéry & Maccari, 2008).
Early-life experience including maternal care profoundly influences hormonal stress
responses during adulthood(Fenoglio, 2004). Fenoglio (2004) found when rat pups were stressed
by daily handling, as compared to undisturbed pups, increased CRH expression was apparent in
the CeA and BNSTs of handled pups. Upon return to their cages, handling-evoked augmentation
of maternal care of pups induced long-lasting reduction of hypothalamic CRH expression. These
changes promote a lifelong attenuation of hormonal stress responses (Fenoglio, 2006).
Alterations in mRNA expression in CeA, BNST as well as PVN may contribute to the molecular
cascade by which handling (and increased maternal care) influences the stress response longterm (Fenoglio, 2006). Neuroplasticity of the HPA in early life requires the recurrent
recruitment of CeA and BNST (Fenoglio, 2006).
Environmental adversity and altered gene expression. Genetic programming governs
many behavioral and physiological phenotypes and promotes susceptibility or resilience to
disease by determining the sequence and expression of specific neuronal genes. These genetic
programs, however, can be modified enduringly as a result of experience taking place during
critical developmental periods. Epigenetic changes include modification of the genetic material
due to methylation and other chemical alteration, as well as non-programmed remolding of an
organism by physical and other environmental effects due to the inherent plasticity of
developmental mechanisms (Korosi & Baram, 2010).
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Animal models suggest that environmental adversity results in parent–offspring
interactions that increase stress reactivity, and sustain effects on gene expression in brain regions
known to regulate behavioral, endocrine, and autonomic responses to stress (Parent et al., 2005).
Roth, Lubin, Funk, and Sweatt (2009) proposed that adverse parental care may contribute to
familial transmission of mental illness. In rats, infant maltreatment resulted in methylation of
brain-derived neurotropic factor (BDNF) DNA through the lifespan to adulthood that
corresponds with reduced BDNF gene expression in the adult PFC. Altered methylation are
passed from one generation to the next, with transmission of phenotype and particularly of
maternal behavior. Further, rodents that have experienced abuse not only grow up and mistreat
their own offspring, but that their offspring also have significant DNA methylation. Despite this,
altered epigenetic marks and gene expression in adult rats can be reversed with a DNA
methylation inhibitor.
Structural remodeling in chronic stress. Neuroplasticity refers to modifications of the
living brain that include chemical exchanges between neurons, changes in cellular excitability
(Centonze, Siracusano, Calabresi, & Bernardi, 2004), neuronal replacement, dendritic
remodeling, and synapse turnover (McEwen et al., 2012). For most of the 20th century, it was
believed that the brain was shaped by sensitive (or critical) periods of rapid growth during early
life, and remained static after that. However, in recent decades, the idea that the brain, nervous
system, genetic makeup change in response to experience has garnered increased support.
Contemporary neuroscience now fosters the idea that the brain changes in response to experience
throughout the lifespan, highlighting the continuing impact of challenging environments in
sculpting the brain through its development (Cozolino, 2010).
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Studies have shed light on the deleterious effects of stress hormones on brain architecture
related to systems of memory, learning, and executive functioning resulting in the reduction or
enlargement of brain structures in humans, as well as dysregulation of cortical and limbic
systems that modulate strong emotions (Bremner, 1999). The amygdala and the prefrontal
cortex, brain regions involved in anxiety and fear, mood, cognitive function and behavioral
control, show structural plasticity. Acute and chronic stress cause an imbalance of neural
circuitry implicated in cognition, decision making, anxiety and mood that can increase or
decrease expression of those behaviors and behavioral states (McEwen et al., 2012). In the
developing brain through adulthood, there also appears to be a remarkable ability to show
reversible structural and functional plasticity in response to stressful and other experiences
(McEwen et al., 2012).
Atrophy of higher systems. The hippocampus and prefrontal cortex are important for
coordinating the adaptive response to stress; their functions are complemented by the amygdala
and the BNST, both of which display a rich population of corticosteroid receptors that are
activated during stress (Pêgo et al., 2008). Plasticity is particularly evident in the hippocampus
(McEwen et al., 2012). In severe cases of anxiety, PTSD has been found to result in atrophy of
the prefrontal cortices (Bremner, 1999). Panic disorder and specific phobias were characterized
by hypoactivity of prefrontal cortex areas that play a role in disinhibiting the amygdala (Engel et
al., 2008).
Early stress research (circa 1990) revealed that individuals with post-traumatic stress
disorder and victims of childhood abuse showed deficits in declarative memory per
neuropsychological testing. Further, MRI studies of those with PTSD showed reductions in
hippocampal volume in these individuals. Cortisol levels were related to memory function, with
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evidence increased memory problems with stress-induced cortisol elevations, and improvement
of memory function with reduction of cortisol levels (Bremner, 1999).
Enlargement of limbic structures. Chronic stress models have been have revealed
hyperactivity of the amygdala and the BNST. GAD or social anxiety were characterized by
hyperactivity of both the amygdala and right prefrontal cortex in adults (Engel et al., 2008).
Schumann (2011), noted that amygdala enlargement In an fMRI study of children ages 7-9, high
levels of childhood anxiety was associated with enlargement of the amygdala, particularly in the
basolateral amygdala (Qin et al., 2014). Fearfulness was correlated with higher amygdala
volumes in a sample of normal healthy females ages 7-17 (van der Plas, Boes, Wemmie, Tranel,
& Nopoulos, 2010).
Using volumetric MRI analysis, De Bellis et al. (2000) demonstrated that children and
adolescents with GAD (mean age 12.7 years) had larger right and total amygdala volume as
compared to age-matched controls. A similar pattern of amygdala enlargement has recently been
reported in adolescents (average age 14.7 years) who showed characteristics of behavioral
inhibition earlier in childhood (Hill, Tessner, Wang, Carter, & McDermott, 2010). However, not
all studies have reported increases in amygdala volume in individuals with pediatric anxiety or
behavioral inhibition. One morphometry analysis that included children with separation anxiety,
social phobia or GAD (mean age 12.9 years) reported a significant grey matter volume reduction
within the left amygdala of children with a pediatric anxiety disorder compared to healthy
controls (Milham et al., 2005). The authors highlighted the fact that pediatric anxiety disorders
are heterogeneous conditions, and although changes in amygdala structure may be present, the
changes depend on the specific diagnoses of the participants (Schumann et al., 2011)
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Pego et al. (2008) found that chronic unpredictable stress induces hyperanxiety without
influencing fear conditioning. Stress-induced hyperanxiety was correlated with increased
volumes of the BNST but not of the amygdala. These changes were primarily seen in the
anteromedial BNST, an area strongly implicated in the neuroendocrine control of the stress
response (Pêgo et al., 2008). Chronic uncontrollable stress affect peptides that affect
neuroplasticity of the BNST and maladaptive remodeling of the BNST associated with anxietylike behavior (Hammack et al., 2009). The behavioral effects of uncontrollable stress can be
blocked by lesion to the BNST (Hammack, Richey, Watkins, & Maier, 2004).
As mentioned previously, deleterious effects of stress are thought to be mediated in part
by dysregulation (e.g., overactivation) of the HPA axis. Structural changes in the BNST
observed after chronic stress correlate with the behavioral responses to stress (Pêgo et al., 2009).
Because regulation of the HPA axis by the hippocampus and other limbic structures is mediated
in part by synaptic relays in the BNST , the BNST is in a key position to regulate not only
anxiety, but also stress responses implicated in neuropathology and precipitation of other
neuropsychological disturbances (Walker et al., 2003).
To review, the BNST appears to act as a relay point into the HPA axis via the PVN.
Findings on the structural modification of the BNST pertain to the modulation of emotional
behavior and the maladaptive response to stress. Specifically, enlargement of the BNST bears on
our understanding of stress-induced hyperactivity of the HPA axis, providing an anatomical basis
for dysregulated closure of this neuroendocrine loop under conditions of chronic stress (Pêgo et
al., 2008).
Changes in connectivity. In those with general anxiety disorder, the amygdala areas have
(a) decreased connectivity with the insula and cingulate areas that control general stimulus
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salience and (b) greater connectivity with the parietal cortex and prefrontal cortex circuits that
underlie executive functions (Etkin, Prater, Schatzberg, Menon, & Greicius, 2009).
Neuroscience of Unlearning Fear
Research using emerging neuroimaging techniques seek to explore a broad range of
psychotherapies, and to guide interventions by specifying what brain regions may be stimulated
in anxiety patients to normalize deficient neural activities (Peres & Nasello, 2008), with the
ultimate goal of improving clinical decision-making and treatment (Roffman, Marci, Glick,
Dougherty, & Rauch, 2005). Reviewing 21 studies using photon emission tomography, positron
emission tomography, and functional magnetic resonance imaging, Peres and Nasello (2008)
found that behavioral and cognitive-behavioral psychotherapies have the potential to modify
dysfunctional neural circuits associated with disorders such as obsessive-compulsive disorder,
major depression, social phobia, specific phobia, and post-traumatic disorder.
In an review of 14 neuroimaging studies on the effects of psychotherapy on anxiety
disorders, Roffmann and colleagues (2005) found reduced abnormalities in brain regions linked
to anxiety disorders, and increased activation of brain regions related to reappraisal of anxietyprovoking stimuli. In addition, van der Kolk (2006) states that changes in the brain in response
to psychotherapeutic intervention appear to be unique from those of pharmacological
interventions. For any given psychiatric disorder, only a partial overlap between the brain
changes associated with pharmacotherapy and those associated with psychotherapy were evident
(Roffman et al., 2005).
Cozolino (2010) states that, “Various psychotherapies are built in the premise that
consciously experienced anxiety provides the opportunity to face and work through fears”
(Cozolino, 2010). This is consistent with Yerkes Dodson Law which posits that optimal learning
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occurs when there is moderate levels of anxiety present (Diamond, Campbell, Park, Halonen, &
Zoladz, 2007). As mentioned previously, emotional arousal evoked by conditioned fear
paradoxically promotes the subsequent extinction of that fear, thereby insuring behavioral
flexibility (Mueller et al., 2008).
Fear extinction pathway. The neurobiological processes that underlie the regulation of
fear and anxiety go hand in hand with the extinction of fear memories inhuman subjects (Schiller
et al., 2008). During reconsolidation, stored information is rendered labile after being retrieved.
Reconsolidation is an adaptive mechanism by which new information is incorporated into old
memories. By introducing new information during the reconsolidation period, it may be possible
to permanently change the fear memory. Schiller (2009) provides evidence in humans that old
fear memories can be updated with non-fearful information provided during the reconsolidation
window in humans. As a consequence, fear responses are no longer expressed (Schiller et al.,
2009).
Recent studies suggest that top-down cognitive processes can attenuate the amydala
response, resulting in down-regulation of fear and anxiety responses. The activation of the
OMPFC is inversely related to that in the amygdala during an emotional experience. Rates of
glucose metabolism in the OMPFC and amygdala are negatively correlated. Tasks requiring
increased cognitive effort (e.g., appraising stimulus content for personal relatedness) that does
not necessarily redirect attention away from emotional content result in attenuation of the
amygdala. Human studies indicate that cognitive appraisal of visual threat activates the OMPFC
and in turn attenuates activity in the amygdala. Amygdaloid activity is attenuated while the
OMPFC and cingulate sulcus (ACC) are activated during a cognitive appraisal condition of
aversive visual stimuli (Phan et al., 2004). Labeling the emotional content reduced activation in
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the amygdala relative to a simple stimulus matching or emotional perception task. In humans,
when subjects turn their attention inward toward themselves, mpfc activity is increased (Hariri,
Mattay, Tessitore, Fera, & Weinberger, 2003).
At the level of the limbic system, active coping prevents the establishment of conditioned
endocrine and behavioral responses. LeDoux and Gorman (2001) showed that in rats, the fear
conditioned pathway responsible for initiating autonomic, endocrine, and behavioral
immobilization reactions may be redirected. When given the option of physically escaping from
an adverse stimulus, subjects lost their conditioning even after a conditioned fear response was
well established. This work suggests that active coping diverts the flow of information from the
lateral nucleus of the amygdala away from the central nucleus to the basal nucleus of the
amygdala, which, in turn projects on motor circuits in the ventral striatum (LeDoux & Gorman,
2001). Van der Kolk (2006) states that:
By engaging these alternative pathways, passive fear responding is replaced with an
active coping strategy. Learning that takes place, does not occur if the rat remains
passive. It requires that the rat take action. It is “learning by doing,” a process in which
the success in terminating the conditioned stimulus reinforces the action taken. (p. 7)
However, the process of extinguishing fear is slow. Although pathways that connect the
amygdala with the cortex provide a channel of communication between cognition and emotion,
these connections are not symmetrical. Projections from the cortex to the amygdala are
considerably weaker than those from the amygdala to the cortex and may explain why strong
emotions are difficult to deactivate (LeDoux, 1995).
HPA regulation. The dorsal mPFC attenuated the expression of CRH in the secretory
region of PVN, and in turn, HPA secretory responses (Radley et al., 2008). Because mPFC
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projections do not target the HPA (via the PVN) directly, intermediary forebrain regions
implicated in inhibitory PVN control were explored. Anatomical tracing and selective
immunotoxin-mediated ablation of anterior BNST experiments implicated BNST cell groups
which project to the PVN in acute stress-induced activation of HPA output. The identification of
the BNST as a mediator of HPA-inhibitory limbic influences contributes to the understanding of
the integration of inhibitory controls of HPA output, adaptations of the HPA to chronic stress,
and how endocrine abnormalities may contribute to stress-related psychiatric illnesses in which
mPFC dysfunction is involved (Radley, Gosselink, & Sawchenko, 2009).
Statement of the Problem and Research Proposal
Two camps that have historical vested interests in fear and anxiety clinical psychology
and neuroscience. Clinical psychology deals largely in examining psychopathology, which
focuses on symptoms of anxiety or panic and classifying symptoms. However, the emphasis on
the pathological features of fear and anxiety without an understanding of their normative states
can be problematic. Van der Kolk (2006) identified lack of appreciation by the insight-oriented,
main staples of psychotherapy, CBT and psychodynamic therapy, for the pre-programmed
physical processes of fear and anxiety. He suggests psychotherapy may be placing biology of
fear and anxiety out of its context in survival, and have instead focused primarily on the
structural and chemical elements of as the main causes of psychopathology (e.g., a lack of
serotonin in depressed individuals, increased dopamine in schizophrenic patients). According to
Van der Kolk,
Psychiatry and psychology may have lost sight of the forest for the trees. It is not the
presence of chemicals that causes fear and anxiety, both neurochemistry and emotions are
activated in order to bring about action: either to engage in physical movements to
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protect, engage, or defend or displaying bodily postures denoting fear, anger, or
depression that invite others to change their behavior. (p. 5)
Psychology and psychiatry focus primarily on the presence of chemical or structural brain
abnormalities that produce emotional states (e.g., a lack of serotonin in depressed individuals,
increased dopamine in schizophrenic patients, excess cortisol in anxiety and panic disorders).
This focus presents a picture of control of these chemicals to reduce symptoms of these
disorders. This suggests that the patient is a passive agent, that there is little they can do about
brain abnormalities they have. It may further suggests the patient as a passive agent, predisposed
to biological markers, with little control over brain abnormalities present since birth, and less on
the effects of the environment in producing these abnormalities.
Further it impinges on one of the most important roles where psychotherapy can focus its
efforts, which is to understand how environment can impact the brain. By drawing awareness to
environment and the activation of these biological processes that counter the development of
psychopathology. An understanding of the process of fear and anxiety, from its acquisition to
expression, may be more naturalistic in that it allows consideration of the individual sensitivities
and experiences of a person and in forming who they have become.
Problems with integration. Although exciting prospects exist for their synthesis,
neuroscience has yet to find a comfortable place in the therapy room. Despite seemingly high
interest among clinicians, digesting and integrating neuroscience in clinical practice remains a
difficult task. Several reasons are enumerated, pertaining to conceptual and practical differences
between neuroscience and psychology.
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1. The lack of integration with adequate, neurobiological models may have contributed to a
classification system in clinical psychology that was devoted largely to clustering their
overt expressions.
2. The language of neuroscience may be daunting to practitioners whose training provides
them with only minimal exposure to neuroscience, and what is offered to them mostly are
textbooks devoted to neuroscience. Language differences aside, other problems may be
at hand, possibly owing to the historical biases of these separate fields that study the same
constructs.
These disparities may pose continued challenges to the symbiosis between the two fields, and
may have wider implications as to how neuroscience is being understood and implemented in
psychology. The gap between how clinical psychology and neuroscience understand and
mechanisms of fear and anxiety have possibly led to some consequences that may affect how
ideas from one field are being interpreted and used in another. Van der Kolk (2006) argued for
greater inclusion of the normative framework in considering pathological models (van der Kolk,
2006).
Research proposal. Although these ideas from neuroscience hold direct implications for
psychotherapy, how can the neuroscience be better presented so it can be integrated
meaningfully in clinical practice? This project seeks to address the problem of how the
neuroscience information is disseminated to clinicians and their patients. Keeping in mind the
historical biases of both neuroscience and clinical psychology, this endeavor seeks to address the
problem of integration by merging the translational gap between basic neuroscience research and
clinical practice. We propose the construction of a concise reference manual on the neuroscience

54
of fear and anxiety that is both data-driven and accounts for the practical and conceptual issues
mentioned above.
This project may yield certain benefits.
1. A concise manual may offer explanations that validate psychotherapeutic technique
employed by therapists of what they are targeting in the brain. This may help therapists
transcend theoretical orientation and establish a common language focused on targeting
brain structures.
2. A concise manual may serve to bridge linguistic barriers, and may offer explanations that
validate psychotherapeutic technique employed by therapists by revealing what they are
targeting in the brain.
3. This framework can be helpful in explaining to our clients tell what is normal vs.
abnormal, as well as elucidate the processes in which their pathological symptoms
emerge. Patients may benefit from an understanding of the brain basis of anxiety and
fear to give another explanation of their disability, one that is less about inadequacy and
self-blame, and more about common experience. Further, they would gain knowledge
about the experience- and social-dependence on neuroplasticity of the brain. From a
cultural standpoint, societies utilize different therapeutic methods to help people cope
with the anxieties of life. An accessible, neuroscience-based explanation as to how these
methods work may provide a unified way of describing and treating these complex
emotions.
4. How this gap is addressed may be pertinent to the goal of retooling psychologists’
understanding of neuroscience from simply focusing on psychopathology to a more
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comprehensive view: that is, the development of disorders from adaptive neurobiological
processes to the protraction of these processes leading disorders of anxiety and fear.
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Chapter 2. Methodology
Neuroanatomical studies on brain mechanisms involved in fear and anxiety have revealed
differential pathways that are not commonly known in the field. In their pathologies, consistent
abnormalities in the limbic areas, HPA axis, and cortical regions have been documented. Of
note, these brain regions are interconnected to one another suggesting the disorders of fear and
anxiety involve dysfunction within HPA. Therefore, the purpose of this investigation were
twofold: 1) to look at the functional circuitry of fear and anxiety and 2) factors that lead to
impairment in this circuitry. To accomplish this, a qualitative inquiry was conducted pertaining
to the functional development and structural/systemic dysfunction of this circuitry in view of
behavioral characteristics of fear and anxiety. Detailed information with reference to areas of
research, databases used along with dates of publication, keywords searched, inclusion/exclusion
criteria, and the primary methods of research used in the present journal article are discussed
below.
Databases and Dates of Publication
The following databases were used to locate journal articles and textbooks relating to the
stated areas of research: PubMed (mid 1950s-2015), Pubget (up to 2015), Medline (mid-1950s2015), PsychInfo (1887-2015), Google Scholar (up to 2015), ScienceDirect (1823-2010), Scopus
(1960-2015), and Wiley Interscience (1799-2015). Textbooks on human/primate evolution,
functional brain development, neural circuitry, and neural dysfunction were also examined.
Key Search Words
The following key words were used: amygdala, anterior cingulate, anxiety and anxiety
disorders, bed nucleus of the stria terminalis, brainstem, cerebral cortex, cingulate, circuitry,
correlates, corticosterone, cortisol, damage, development, differential involvement, dorsalmedial
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prefrontal cortex, dysfunction, emotional regulation, epigenetic, evolution, extinction, fearconditioning, functions, glucocorticoids, hippocampus, hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis,
inferior parietal lobe, insula, learning, lesion, limbic region, memory, neurochemistry,
neuroplasticity, orbital medial prefrontal cortex, panic and panic disorders, phylogeny, primates,
sensory cortex, sensory association cortex, stress, and volumetric studies.
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria of Studies
Scholarly journals and publications were investigated. Literature including rodent,
primate, and human subjects were reviewed pertaining to functional brain development and
structural/systemic brain dysfunction. Subjects in the reviewed literature ranged in age from
gestation to adulthood and were predominantly from animal and human populations.
Consultation
Experts were consulted on topics related to the evolution of fear and anxiety mechanisms
and the state of our current understanding of them. Email correspondence with Michael Davis
and David Walker were instrumental clarification on topics related to the amygdala and bed
nucleus of the stria terminalis. George Alheid and Joel Price were consulted on the evolution of
the extended amygdala.
Primary Methods of Research
The literature included studies that used three primary methods to examine the functional
development of brain structures and circuitry extending from the brainstem, the limbic system,
and cortical regions. These methods included electrophysiological stimulation techniques,
imaging techniques, and microscopy with staining, and both anterograde and retrograde tracing.
Structural and functional brain imaging techniques detect the location and the neural
circuits involved through measuring the change in blood flow in the brain. This measurement

58
often allows for the association of neural activity with specific mental functions. Microscopy
allows for the observation of biological tissues, structures, and neural connectivity. This is often
paired with a variety of staining techniques that concentrate in different parts of the cells and
tissues, further highlighting specific areas for observation.
Mapping was conducted through retro- and anterograde tracing methods. Anterograde
tracing is a method used to chemically trace axonal projections from their source (the cell body)
to their point of termination (the synapse). In contrast, retrograde tracing is used to trace axonal
projections from the point of termination to the source. Much of what is currently known about
the connectivity of different brain regions was achieved through anterograde and retrograde
tracing techniques. Both of these methods allow the detailed descriptions of neuronal projections
from a single population of neurons to their various targets throughout the nervous system. These
techniques allow the mapping of connections between neurons in a particular structure and the
target neurons in the brain.
Further, examination of dysfunctional brain regions was accomplished through both
intentional lesions to specific brain regions in animal models, and measurement of subsequent
impairments in ability-specific tasks. With regard to examination of damage to regions within
this circuitry, lesions were mechanically or chemically created in animal subjects. Furthermore,
ability-specific task-performance was also used to determine the quality and severity of
impairment resulting from the lesion.
Analysis of Data and Integration of Findings
The initial focus of this project was to uncover and confirm a possible dichotomy in the
way fear and anxiety are processed. This idea for this project was spawned by my advisor, who
asked me to “look into a structure called the ‘bed nucleus of the stria terminalis,’ and find out
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everything about it.” The dichotomy was confirmed through the work of Michael Davis and his
colleagues, as well as other investigators involvment the BNST in while sparing the amygdala.
This led us to want explore the of the amygdala and BNST in relation to anxiety and panic
disorders to attempt to differentiate possible impairments or volumetric differences between
these two structures. Owing to the paucity of studies on the BNST and specific anxiety
disorders, in contrast to an abundance of studies showing amygdala enlargement in an array of
anxiety and panic disorders, it was concluded that were not able to continue this particular
endeavour.
We decided to shift our focus onto examining other aspects of the dichotomy between the
BNST and CeA, paying particular attention to connectivity. Examination into associated
brainstem, limbic, and neocortical structures was conducted to determine their roles in
supporting or regulating anxiety and fear responses via the BNST and CeA. Studies by Dong
and Swanson, detailing the extensive connectivity of the BNST to the HPA axis, suggested its
role as the prime intermediate structure, through which both limbic and neocortical information
is funneled, in modulating the HPA axis and the production of cortisol.
In addition, focus on connectivity issues revealed that the BNST and CeA were influenced
by different memory systems (the hippocampus vs. the LA+lCeA circuit, respectively). The idea
that conditioned fear memory lies within the amygdala itself challenges existing notions in
clinical psychology that the hippocampus is the primary informer and regulator of strong
emotional responses from amygdala, and provides a possible, new narrative of the involvement
of unconscious memory in fear vs. conscious memory in anxiety.
Recent literature in neuroscience has provided greater clarity and enhanced specificity in
detailing structure-to-function and pathways involved in fear and anxiety. Emerging out of this
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investigation, it became evident the neuroscience involved in fear and anxiety was more complex
than what is commonly known in clinical psychology. Integration of the above findings
contributes to an updated model of the neuroscience of fear and anxiety that will best be
presented in a concise manual that is accessible to mental health clinicians.
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Chapter 3. The Neuroscience Of Fear Vs. Anxiety: A Primer
With myriad expressions from panic, to lingering feelings of apprehension and tension, to
intense flashbacks experienced in post-traumatic stress, fear and anxiety are an undeniable aspect
of most living organisms. While we know what they feel and look like in our everyday lives, our
common tendency is to dwell on the burdens they create and aspire to rid our lives of them
entirely. But rather than take this view, we might want to look at why these emotions evolved to
take a purposeful place in our lives.
Since the mid-1990s, a confluence of studies in neuroscience and comparative
neuroanatomy has advanced our understanding of how fear and anxiety work in the brain. From
this research, clues emerged as to how these emotions evolved as defenses that have been
advantageous to the survival of many species. And though they evolved to serve critically
important purposes, we also have learned how fear and anxiety can shape into forms that no
longer serve us, instead interfering with how we live our lives.
But how might an exploration of the neuroscience underlying these emotional
phenomena help us? One important reason is to cultivate an appreciation for how the interactions
between biology and environment leave indelible imprints on our brains. Additionally, an
exploration of this aspect of the brain helps us to understand how fear and anxiety allow us to
adapt to challenges, as well as document how what we take and make of our world affect our
brains. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this investigation may help us to become more
aware of our true place between extremes on opposite sides of a spectrum: on one end, the
unrealistic perception of fearlessness, and on the other, the state of being endlessly consumed by
our fears.
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Stress, Fear, and Anxiety: An Adaptive Relationship
From the earliest invertebrates to humans, living organisms have strived to maintain
homeostasis, a complex and dynamic balance of one’s internal environment. This balance is
challenged constantly by external and internal demands, creating the stress, or the non-specific
response to any demand for change, we feel in our bodies (Habib, Gold, & Chrousos, 2001;
Selye, 1949). To return to a state of homeostasis, the ability of an organism to adapt to stress is
vital to preserve its viability (Gunnar & Quevedo, 2007; McEwen, 1999). Adaptation, or the
stress response, allows the organism to maintain stability through change (Sterling & Eyer,
1988).
Fear and anxiety are stress responses to external or internal threat that allow an organism
to return to a state of homeostasis (see Figure 5). They share a common goal of seeking to
change the condition that a threat presents, allowing the body to recuperate and return to
homeostasis.
Homeostasis

Stress

Fear/panic

Stress response

Return to homeostasis

Figure 5. Fear and anxiety as stress responses.

Anxiety
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While intricately related and often used interchangeably, fear and anxiety are easily felt,
but not so easily understood, defined, nor teased apart. In part, this may be because their
multitude expressions overlap widely and simultaneously engage our emotions, thoughts, and
behaviors. We may experience a range of distress and alarm. Our attention may be deeply
focused on a threat and we may also associate its surrounding circumstances with harm, forming
memories to help us prevent future occurrences of danger (LeDoux, 2012). We may display fear,
anger, or depression, all of which invite others to help us manage our behavior. And ultimately,
we may be motivated to take action: to escape, to defend ourselves by engaging a threat, or by
succumbing to it altogether. (van der Kolk, 2006).
We may also be bewildered by what triggers them. Threats can be very specific. Or they
can be diffuse cues that we associated with a previous danger. They can vary along dimensions
of their proximity to us, as well as how long they last. Threats can also be representations of
danger that exist in our memories, both those that we can recall easily and those out of our
immediate awareness but nevertheless, have significant impacts on our lives. While it may be
impossible to list the combinations origin, proximity, and duration, these different characteristics
of threat can trigger either fear or anxiety and have differential impacts on how we attend to, how
we remember and interpret, and how we deal with threats that present themselves (see Table 7).
Table 7
Fear versus Anxiety
Triggers

Temporal
Profile

Fear (or Panic)
Threats perceived as life-threatening
(Davis, 1997; Barlow, Brown, & Craske,
1994).

Anxiety
Potential danger, distal, and contextual or
symbolic threats.

Short in duration, lasting milliseconds to
seconds, and resolves upon the termination
of a threat (Pego et al., 2010).

Long-term state (Rennie, 1948), lasting
from minutes to hours.
(continued)
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Fear (or Panic)
An emotional alarm characterized by
intense apprehension, terror, and feelings
of impending doom

Anxiety
Worry, apprehensive expectation, tension,
and feelings of unpredictability and
uncontrollability.

Behaviors

A fight response taken to alter the impact
of a threat, a flight response representing
escape or changing course, or a
freezing/immobilization response.

Risk assessment and avoidance.

Learning

Previous or innate learning that specific
contexts predict imminent harm (Grillon,
2008).

Previous learning that certain contexts
surrounding a specific threat may also be
associated with adversity. These
associations have been generalized (Grillon,
2007).

Attention

Attention is drawn toward a threat
(attentional bias) and inhibits competing
responses, making it more difficult to
contextualize a situation.

Attention is drawn not only to the threat, but
a number of associated stimuli in the
environment may represent danger.

Awareness

Fear is believed to function without
conscious awareness. In fear, conscious,
cognitive appraisal of the threat is absent.

Conscious cognitive appraisal of a threat is
prerequisite of anxiety (Lazarus, 1991). The
thought process involved in anxiety is
conscious.

Memory

Implicit/unconscious memory.

Explicit/conscious memory.

Purpose

Addresses the immediate physical survival of
an organism. Fear is adaptive when one is
confronted with a real, actual threat (Barlow,
Brown, & Craske, 1994). However, fear
responses become maladaptive when they last
longer than the presence of a threat, or when
it becomes activated when the threat is not
present.

Prepares an organism for a second stressor
or a chronic stressor (Woody & Szechtman,
2011)

Emotions

Immediate and Preparatory Response Systems
When we are faced with a threat, a cascade of electrical, hormonal, and neuro-immune
activity takes place within the brain, all aimed at preparing us to adapt to or reduce its impact.
Adapting to stress involves activation of biological systems that detect not only environmental
challenges, but also opportunities to bring closure to a situation and achieve internal
physiological adjustment (LeDoux, 2012).
As defensive responses, fear and anxiety are organized hierarchically along a spectrum of
safety to dangerousness. In an environment safe from dangers, a minimal threat level is
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supported by neural mechanisms that facilitate responses for social interactions. On the other
hand, an organism attends more keenly to the environment because of novelty or potential threat.
Fear occurs when danger is imminent, mobilizing fight-or-flight responses, or triggering
immobilization or freezing when fight-or-flight responses are not an option (Porges, 2001).
By viewing these differences of why they are employed, we get a picture that these
adaptive responses evolved to address imminent and preparatory defensive needs of an organism.
Within all complex animals, systems in the brain and body evolved to execute defensive
responses to help maintain internal balance.
Autonomic nervous system. The autonomic nervous system (ANS) regulates processes
that allow us to maintain homeostasis. It consists of a series of hierarchical levels encompassing
neocortical, limbic, and brainstem structures, with the higher levels being responsible for more
widespread and general functions. These functions—such as heart rate, digestion, smooth muscle
function, glandular activity, and the control of stress hormones—do not require consciousness.
The ANS is comprised of systems involved in adaptation to stressors that pose an immediate
threat, potential threat, as well as mechanisms that calm us after a threat is over.
Sympathetic nervous system. When confronted with immediate danger, we experience
an initial surge of alarm and arousal and are flooded with fear. This state represents the
sympathetic nervous system, which supports a number of biological systems that are activated to
mobilize energy, such as increasing heart and lung functions to facilitate delivery of oxygen and
glucose to tissue. Energy storage is halted by suppressing digestion, growth, reproduction,
inflammatory, and immune responses.
These processes work to support fight-flight-freeze responses, act quickly (milliseconds
to seconds), and persist until the acute emergency has been survived. The sympathetic nervous

66
system is composed of fibers from thoracic and upper lumbar levels of the spinal cord that
connect directly to internal organs in the main cavities of the body and blood vessels of the
limbs, or return to spinal nerves.
Hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis. The hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis
refers to a complex set of interactions between the hypothalamus, pituitary glands in the brain,
and the adrenal glands perched on top of the kidneys. It is part of a system that guides autonomic
and energy homeostasis and can be found in the earliest vertebrates (Dong & Swanson, 2004a;
Denver, 2009).
In the stress response, the HPA axis is primarily involved the production of the stress
hormone cortisol in humans. These hormones affect the storage and expenditure of energy
during stress (Choi, Evanson, et al., 2007; Dong & Swanson, 2004b). After the initial surge of
sympathetic activity subsides, the HPA axis prepares the organism for subsequent danger: a
process that acts slowly from minutes to hours in preparation for another threat to materialize.
But because not all stressors present as life-threatening emergencies, the HPA axis can also be
triggered without activating the sympathetic nervous system (Woody, 2011).
Parasympathetic nervous system. The parasympathetic nervous system is made up of
fibers that issue from the brainstem and sacral part of the spinal cord and is concerned with
functions, such as digestion, metabolism, excretion, and lowering of heart rate (Davis, 1997).
When we respond adaptively to a threat by engaging with or avoiding it, conditions change in the
environment, and the body respond in kind. The parasympathetic nervous system helps to calm
us after an emergency is over. When a threat subsides, the parasympathetic nervous system is
activated to inhibit sympathetic and HPA effects on tissue and organs, allowing the body to
recuperate and reinstate homeostasis (Porges, 2001).

67

Homeostasis
Autonomic Nervous System

Stress

Fear/Panic
Sympathetic Nervous
System

Stress Response

Anxiety
HPA Axis

Return to Homeostasis
Parasympathetic Nervous
System

Figure 6. Sympathetic and HPA axis activation in the stress response.
Neuroanatomy of Fear and Anxiety
From the moment we are born, the brain circuitry involved in fear and anxiety are online.
Evolving from what originated as an ancient system dedicated to physical survival, these circuits
are part of an inherited legacy present in all complex animals (invertebrates and vertebrates),
having been shaped over billions of years of evolution and through billions of brains (LeDoux,
2012). Over the evolution from reptiles to humans, three layers of the brain evolved in part to
address threats to survival. From this common ancestry, key defensive functions and associated
brain structures in lower animals expanded to newer areas in in higher animals.
The reptilian brain represents the innermost and the most primitive layer of the triune
brain that facilitates motor responses to escape imminent physical threat in the form of predators.
The limbic system is the middle layer of the triune brain that gained prominence in the brains of
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mammals. As adaptivity depended on the ability to detect a threat rapidly, alert the organism, and
appraise life-threatening events (LeDoux, 1996), limbic structures facilitated emotional to motor
responses to increase physical and temporal space between the self and the source of the threat
across environmental landscapes. Limbic structures also helped to preserve this space between
oneself and a threat through continual learning and monitoring of the environment.
The neocortex is the outermost layer of the triune brain that assumed prominence in
primates and reached its peak size and evolution in the human brain. Abstract thought,
imagination, and development of language are believed to have emerged with the rise of the
neocortex. Its size in mammals correlates positively with social group size and is believed to
have evolved in part to increase the chances of survival in social landscapes by navigate the
cognitive demands of competitive and cooperative relationships (Barton & Aggleton, 2000). The
ability to recognize interpersonal threats suggests that fear and anxiety may have developed to
appraise dominant or submissive group members (Öhman & Mineka, 2001).
On the other hand, the evolution of culture and social norms may have served to attenuate
fear and anxiety by enhancing the control and predictability of environmental and social
landscapes. Beyond the advent of tools and weapons by humans that helped to procure resources
and defend against physical threat, behavioral scripts, language, and communal activities
fostered cooperation. Art and storytelling served to pass on knowledge, thereby enhancing the
predictability of the world for generations to come (Bronowski, 1973).
With the addition of layers and increased neural complexity, the behavioral and affective
repertoire of higher animals became enriched (Porges, 2007). In the mammalian brain,
phylogenetically newer layers exercised greater control over/inhibit more primitive layers
(Jackson, 1958; Porges, 2007). Among other functions, the interaction between these layers
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helped coordinate responses of approach or avoidance depending on the nature of a presenting
threat, facilitated learning to enhance predictability and control over the environment, and
provided awareness of oneself through space and time to keep threats at bay (Öhman & Mineka,
2001). Despite this expansion, core components of these circuits were kept (or conserved) if they
proved useful, as reflected in some neuroanatomical similarities among reptiles, lower mammals,
primates, and humans (LeDoux, 2012). These anatomical artifacts reflect the importance of
retaining this circuitry and lasting functions that are built for survival.
Reptilian brain structures. Within the reptilian brain lies a collection of structures
known as the brainstem that serves as a relay center of sensory and motor information between
the brain and the spinal cord. The role of the brainstem is complex, controlling basic functions
such as heart rate, breathing, body temperature, circulation, and balance. Brainstem structures
respond to immediate threat by activating the sympathetic nervous system that produces fight,
flight, and freezing responses and the mechanisms that support them. These include:
•

Production of the stress hormone norepinephrine in the locus coeruleus

•

A surge of arousal and increased vigilance

•

Startle and facial expressions of fear

•

Impaired social interactions

•

Decreased sensitivity to pain

•

Panting and respiratory distress to increase oxygen supply (Davis, 1997, Davis, 1998;
LeDoux, 1996; Ohman & Mineka, 2001; Porges 2001).

Limbic structures. The limbic system is believed to be the center of emotional
processing and is also the seat of unconscious values that exert a strong influence on behavior.
Limbic structures attach emotional salience to incoming sensory information, and facilitate
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perception and memory for emotionally meaningful material. In fear and anxiety, they are
critical for motivation and coordination of approach-or-avoid responses (Phan, Wager, Taylor, &
Liberzon, 2004).
The thalamus. The thalamus receives information from nearly every sensory organ in the
body. This information is relayed to the somatosensory association cortex in the parietal lobe of
the brain that integrates the sights, sounds, smells, and tactile sensations of a threat. This allows
us to construct an understanding of the object being felt and helps in planning movement (van
der Kolk, 2006).
The amygdala. The amygdala is almond-shaped structure is involved in both reward- and
stress-related emotions that comes online immediately before birth (Cozolino, 2006). In humans,
the activation of the amygdala has been observed in the perception and processing of direct and
indirect threats such as fearful faces, threats in complex visual situations (Ohnman & Mineka,
2001), outgroup versus ingroup faces, and threatening words and vocalizations (Adolphs &
Tranel, 1999). In anxiety and other psychiatric disorders where chronic stress is a risk factor, the
amygdala is known to be enlarged owing to over-activity.
The amygdala is highly connected to many parts of the brain, highlighting its widespread
influence. Three of its approximately 15 known regions have been associated with specific roles
in fear and anxiety:
•

The basolateral amygdala (BLA) attaches an emotional value to incoming or
perceived stimuli. In both fear and anxiety, the BLA assesses the salience of a threat
and determines whether a fear or anxiety response is appropriate to a situation.

•

The lateral nucleus of the amygdala has been implicated in consolidation of
conditioned fear memories or implicit memories. These memories are difficult to
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access consciously and activate reflexive responses (LeDoux, 1995; Schafe &
LeDoux, 2000).
•

The central nucleus of the amygdala (CeA) plays a key role in executing a fear
response to a specific threat (Davis, 1997). The CeA has been linked to the expression
of fear, and not as much to anxiety, given its robust connections to brainstem areas
that control rapid sympathetic effects including fight, flight, and freezing. Its limited
connectivity to the HPA axis gives it minimal control of neuroendocrine responses to
stress (Choi, Evanson, et al., 2007; Graeff, 2007).

The bed nucleus of the stria terminalis. The bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (BNST)
is a cell mass in the basal or non-cortical division of the brain. Its neurons are among the earliest
formed in the cerebral hemispheres (Dong, Petrovich, Watts, & Swanson, 2001). The BNST lies
close to the amygdala, but on the opposite side of the stria terminalis (Fudge & Haber, 2001).
Like the amygdala, the BNST is highly connected to different parts of the brain, responds
to both stress- and reward-related stimuli, and links to both the brainstem and HPA axis (Fudge
& Haber, 2001; Shin, Geerling, & Loewy, 2008). It shares a particularly close resemblance to the
CeA in terms of the shape of its cells and neurotransmitter content. Unlike the CeA, however, the
BNST is strongly implicated in stress responses triggered by diffuse or contextual threat stimuli.
Further, its effects appear to last longer in duration than those produced by the CeA. These
characteristics suggest that the role of the BNST is more akin to anxiety, whereas the CeA’s role
is more similar to fear ( Casada & Dafny, 2010; Davis et al., 1997; Pêgo et al., 2008).
Its position allows it to relay both limbic and neocortical information to the HPA axis to
modulate neuroendocrine responses (Choi, Furay, et al., 2007; Radley, Gosselink, & Sawchenko,
2009).. The dorsalmedial division of the BNST generates the densest known inputs to the HPA
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axis of any part of the cerebral hemispheres (Dong & Swanson, 2005; Pêgo, Sousa, Almeida, &
Sousa, 2009). Further, other BNST regions are known to both excite as well as inhibit the HPA
axis (Choi, Furay, et al., 2007).
Although the BNST and HPA axis are susceptible to chronic stress, this is a not onedimensional relationship. Often, if we are exposed to the same stressor multiple times, we
habituate to it, making it predictable and easier to tolerate which eases our anxiety (Pego, 2009;
Woody & Szechtman, 2011). Exposure to these invariant stressors decreases the size of the
BNST (Pego et al., 2008), which in turn produces rapid and enduring depression of HPA
responses (Tartar, King, & Devine, 2006). In contrast, chronic, unpredictable stress can increase
our sensitivity to subsequent stressors, resulting enlargement of the BNST owing to its overactivation and prolonged HPA activation (Pego et al., 2008; Pego 2010).
The hypothalamus. Located at the base of the brain, the hypothalamus is a production
center for hormones that control various organs in the autonomic nervous system. In the stress
response, the paraventricular nucleus (PVN) of the hypothalamus acts as the gateway to the HPA
axis. The hypothalamus connects to and influences the pituitary gland, which in turn influences
the adrenal gland in the production of the stress hormone, cortisol.
The hippocampus. The hippocampus plays a central role in the learning and memory. In
adapting to a threat, the hippocampus helps to provide information of past threats to help guide
behavior in current threatening situations (Barton & Aggleton, 2000; Walker, Toufexis, & Davis,
2003). It may also be involved in probing for possible danger and creating mental scenarios in
which vague signs materialize as real threat to facilitate predictions about upcoming events
(Woody & Szechtman, 2011).
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The hippocampus is rich with receptors for stress hormones that modulate the strength of
declarative memories (LeDoux & Phelps, 2008; Woody & Szechtman, 2011). Its close proximity
and dense ties to the amygdala make the hippocampus susceptible to the influence of strong
emotional responses.
In intense fear reactions, formation of conscious memories is impaired. The ability to
form unconscious, fear-conditioned memories remains intact, however, because these memories
are housed within the amygdala itself (LeDoux & Phelps, 2011; Penzo, Robert, & Li, 2014). In a
number of psychiatric disorders, atrophy of the hippocampus has been observed, highlighting its
vulnerability to prolonged stress responses.
The insula. The insula is a limbic structure believed to process emotionally relevant
information between somatic internal feelings and external cues to guide behavioral responses
(Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2004). In fear and anxiety, the insula serves as an alarm
center for internally sensed dangers to changes in the environment. The insula receives integrated
sensory information from regions of the thalamus and the somatosensory cortex.
Through widespread, reciprocal connections the insula relays this fluid information about
the environment to the amygdala (and in particular, to the CeA) where appropriate responses to
danger are determined (Phan et al., 2004). The insula also works in tandem with the BNST to
track threat proximity and maintain hypervigilance, a key symptom underlying many anxiety
disorders, in highly anxious people (Somerville, Whalen, & Kelley, 2010; Alvarez, Chen,
Bodurka, Kaplan, & Grillon, 2011).
The anterior cingulate. The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is a central station for
processing cognitive, emotional, and behavioral information, assigning control between
neocortical, limbic, and brainstem areas (Fuchs & Flügge, 2003; Phan et al., 2004). It is part of a
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system that orchestrates the autonomic, neuroendocrine, and behavioral expression of emotion
(van der Kolk, 2006). Its involvement is critical in maintaining emotional stability (Phan et al.,
2004).
The ACC is constantly influenced by fluid threat information from incoming sensory
information as well as feedback from defensive responses that seek to change conditions in the
environment (Fuchs & Flügge, 2003). In responding to threat, the ACC is involved in a sequence
of actions that include response selection, determining reaction speed and producing gut
reactions (Fuchs & Flügge, 2003; Cozolino, 2010). Along with higher cortical centers, it is also
involved evaluating whether a response to a situation is correct or not (Banich, 2009).
The neocortex. The neocortex is the rational or thinking brain that is considered to be
flexible and possesses almost infinite learning abilities. Structures of the neocortex are involved
in managing cognitive processes that influence sensory perception, guides behavioral responses
and help to regulate strong emotions. When fear and/or anxiety are activated, prefrontal regions
of the neocortex work with key limbic areas to inhibit strong emotions.
The orbitalmedial prefrontal cortex. The orbitomedial prefrontal cortex (OMPFC) is a
prefrontal area that evolves during childhood (Cozolino, 2010). The OMPFC prevents the
generalization of fearful behavior by attenuating sympathetic and hormonal responses to stress
(van der Kolk, 2006) through the inhibition of subcortical limbic structures. The OMPFC plays a
role in the inhibition of fear responses generated by the amygdala (Phan et al., 2004; Milad,
Vidal-Gonzalez, & Quirk, 2004). In addition, it is also involved in reductions in anxiety by
regulating HPA activity via the BNST (Radley et al., 2009).
The OMPFC is activated via increased effort on tasks, such as cognitive appraisal of a
threat or labeling emotions, that do not redirect attention away our emotions (Phan et al., 2004).
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Under the right level of emotional arousal, and OMPFC involvement helps to strengthen
memories for fears that we have unlearned and promote behavioral flexibility (Mueller, Porter, &
Quirk, 2008). These inhibitory processes are slow, however. Because projections from the cortex
to the amygdala are considerably weaker than those from the amygdala to the cortex, strong
emotions are difficult to deactivate (LeDoux, 1995).
For better or worse, however, inhibitory functions of the OMPFC can be overridden
easily when fear takes over. The OMPFC, along with the hippocampus, is also involved in the
spontaneous recovery of previously extinguished fear memory (Milad et al., 2007). In severe
anxiety disorders, such as PTSD, and certain such panic disorders, the OMPFC is known to show
morphological and functional abnormalities, suggesting that extinction circuits are compromised
(Quirk, Garcia, & González-Lima, 2006; Shin Rauch Pitman, 2006).
The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is
involved with the management of a number of cognitive processes including directing attention,
organizing memory and integration of senses and temporal experience and motor sequences to
guide behavior (Cozolino, 2010). Reasoning abilities improved strategizing in threatening
situations to guide and assess decisions whether to approach or avoid. One hypothesis suggests
that the DLPFC creates an appropriate attentional set of rules to accomplish a goal and selects
the representation that will fulfill the goal. The ACC is responsible for response selection and
evaluates the response, deciding whether one was correct or incorrect. Activity increases in the
ACC when the probability of an error is higher. If the DLPFC imposes a great deal of control on
the response, the ACC will require less activity (Banich, 2009).
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Neurochemistry of Fear and Anxiety
Neurochemicals include neurotransmitters, hormones, and peptides that help to facilitate
communication between neurons. In the face of threat, they facilitate behavioral and
neuroendocrine effects seen in fear and anxiety (Davis, 1998; Muller et al., 2003; Sajdyk et al.,
1999; Szechtman & Woody, 2004). These chemicals potentiate brain mechanisms involved in
heart rate, blood pressure, respiration, and gastrointestinal responses. Behaviorally, we see
increased motor activity in a familiar environment, and decreased motor activity in unfamiliar
environment. (Woody & Szechtman, 2011).
Norepinephrine. Norepinephrine is a stress hormone and neurotransmitter produced in
the brainstem. Its release increases sympathetic activity while inhibiting parasympathetic activity
(Ramos, 2007). It supports the fight-or-flight response by increasing heart rate, triggering the
release of glucose from energy stores, increasing blood flow to skeletal muscle, and increasing
the brain’s oxygen supply. Emotionally, it increases feelings of fear and anxiety by acting on the
limbic system. Norepinepherine alters cognitive functions by shifting one’s focus towards a
potential threat. It also heightens vigilance and detection and analysis of threat by optimizing
scanning and sampling of the environment (Woody, 2011). Norepinephrine can increase working
memory, but an excess may decrease working memory (Ramos, 2007).
Corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH). CRH is a peptide produced in the brain
within the paraventricular nucleus of the hypothalamus. CRH innervates the brain and spine
during times of stress. In intense stress, norepinephrine stimulates CRH secretion from the
hypothalamus (Ramos, 2007). It acts on limbic system, which induces ACTH release from the
anterior pituitary and subsequent cortisol release in the adrenal glands (Ramos, 2007). CRH also
feeds back to modulate the production of norepinephrine and cortisol (Benarroch, 2009).
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Glucocorticoids. Glucocorticoids (a.k.a. cortisol in humans and corticosterone in rats)
are produced in the adrenal glands in the kidneys as part of the HPA axis (Dunn, 1987). In the
stress response, glucocorticoids target organ systems that will help an organism address
immediate and diffuse or distal stressors (Woody, 2011). Glucocorticoids support the immediate
needs by enhance energy availability; that is, by increasing circulating glucose (the fuel needed
in cells) and inhibiting glucose storage (Sapolsky et al., 2000).
Glucocorticoids also prime mechanisms that help an organism adapt to a subsequent
stressor and/or to a chronic stressor by potentiating sympathetic effects on the cardiovascular
system without producing an actual sympathetic activation in case potential danger turns into an
actual threat. These hormones exert their effects for prolonged periods and involve changes in
gene transcription (Sapolsky et al., 2000; Woody, 2011). In the recovery stage, glucocorticoids
exert negative feedback on the HPA axis, thereby limiting its activation (Choi, Evanson, et al.,
2007; Choi, Furay, et al., 2007; Choi et al., 2008).
Fear and Anxiety Circuitry
The pathways run through an interactive zone between cognition and emotion, and are
the roadways along which electrical and chemical signals travel. Goal-directed behavior,
motivation, and self-control involved in fear, anxiety, and other emotional experiences, are born
from the interplay between limbic and neocortical areas (Fuchs & Flügge, 2003).
While genetics may exert a strong influence on the development of these circuits, our
environments matter deeply in shaping how these circuits develop, particularly during periods of
rapid brain development in early childhood (Gunnar & Quevedo, 2007). Nurturing environments
promote adaptive coping. Here, fear and anxiety pathways are triggered when needed and shut
off quickly once an emergency is over.
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Fear pathway: Activating the brainstem. Some emotions are generated from our
sensory perceptions of the environment. In fear, a threat that is deemed to be immediate is
processed quickly and unconsciously. This process only involves the subcortical part of the brain
and is believed to work without conscious experience of the stimulus, overriding higher cortical
processes. It is regarded as a more primitive mechanism of defense, evolving from lesserdeveloped animals that have not evolved a more complex part of the brain (see Figure 7).
1. In the processing of fear, signals from our sensory organs are collected in the
thalamus (LeDoux, 1996; Davis, 1997). These integrated signals converge in the
basolateral amygdala, where the seriousness of a threat is determined, after accessing
the lateral amygdala where conditioned fear memories are stored. In this appraisal
phase, dense neural ties and close proximity between regions of the amygdala allow
for rapid and efficient transmission of threat-related information (Barton & Aggleton,
2000; Pego et al., 2010).
2. When the threat is determined to be immediate, these signals are then sent to CeA,
where determinations of appropriate response are made (Davis, 2001).
3. Signals are relayed to brainstem and hypothalamic targets (Davis, 2001). Because the
CeA has a profound influence on the brainstem, and limited influence on
hypothalamic targets, greater sympathetic activation is observed (Choi, 2007; Graeff,
2007).
4. The activation of the sympathetic nervous system (via the brainstem) results in rapid,
automatic responses to danger and produces fear behaviors fight, fight, or freezing
responses (Davis, 1997). These responses are processed very quickly, and are
generally short lived.
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Figure 7. Fear pathway stage 1.
Anxiety accompanies the initial surge of fear. When a threat no longer presents as
immediate due to defensive actions, anxiety is activated to keep the individual attentive to
recurrences of an adverse situation (Pego et al., 2010). In more developed animals, anxiety will
always accompany fear to prepare an organism for a second stressor or to adapt to a chronic
stressor. These two pathways work simultaneously (see Figure 8).
1. Attention is tuned to potential or diffuse stimuli surrounding the initial threat. Here,
signals from a host of sensory modalities from the thalamus, sensory cortex, multiple
and limbic structures are integrated (LeDoux, 1996; Davis, 1997).
2. These sensory signals converge on the BLA, where determinations of appropriate
response are made.
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3. Signals are then sent to the BNST (Davis, 1998).
4. Signals are relayed to hypothalamic and limited brainstem targets (Davis & Whalen,
2001). Robust connections between the BNST and the HPA axis highlight the BNST
in modulating neuroendocrine responses to stress.
5. The protracted nature of anxiety is similar neuroendocrine functioning in that both are
slow to initiate and prolonged in their response, which last anywhere from minutes to
hours (Walker, Toufexis, & Davis, 2003).
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ACC

Insula
Specific Threat
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Figure 7. Fear pathway stage 2: Activation of anxiety and the HPA axis.
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Anxiety (alone) pathway. Although fear begets anxiety, anxiety does not necessarily
beget fear. In contrast to the route taken by fear, the processing of sensory information related to
non-life-threatening, distal, diffuse, or potential threat takes a slower route. This route includes
the cortical parts of the brain which, in turn, can prohibit intense fear responses generated by the
amygdala (McRae et al., 2012; see Figure 8).
1. In the processing of diffuse threat, signals from a host of sensory modalities from the
thalamus, sensory cortex, multiple and limbic structures are integrated (LeDoux, 1996;
Davis, 1997).
2. When the threat is determined to be diffuse or distant, signals converge on the BLA,
where determinations of appropriate response are made.
3. Signals are then sent to the BNST (Davis, 1998).
4. Signals are relayed to hypothalamic and limited brainstem targets (Davis & Whalen,
2001). Robust connections between the BNST and the HPA axis highlight the BNST in
modulating neuroendocrine responses to stress.
5. The protracted nature of anxiety is similar neuroendocrine functioning in that both are
slow to initiate and prolonged in their response, which last anywhere from minutes to
hours (Walker, Toufexis, & Davis, 2003).
When fear and anxiety take over. In contrast to the pathway of an adaptive stress
response, if fear and anxiety circuits are prolonged or exaggerated, they can result in disease.
And when taken to an extreme, they can have deleterious effects on the architecture of the brain
and impacting systems of memory, learning, emotion, and executive functioning, all of which are
critical in helping us cope (Pego et al., 2010).
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Figure 8. Anxiety alone pathway.
Adverse, and usually chronic and unpredictable stressors, can shape fear and anxiety
circuits at any point in the lifespan from our prenatal existence through adulthood. Prenatal stress
in mothers, as well as adverse experiences such as maternal separation, and emotional and/or
physical abuse, can lead to increased stress responding in children. Beyond childhood, frequent
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neurobiological stress responses can lead to hyperactivity of these circuits and enlargement of
the amygdala and BNST, prolonged HPA axis responses, as well as atrophy and disenabling of
higher cortical centers that help us regulate our emotions.
Sustained effects of fear and anxiety also impact how genes express in brain regions that
regulate behavioral, endocrine, and autonomic responses to stress, and can also shape how genes
get passed on from one generation to the next. The combination of our genes and adverse
environmental challenges can increase our risk for anxiety disorders and other mental health
disorders, as well as stress-related and other physical illness through adulthood (Darnaudéry &
Maccari, 2008).
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Chapter 4. Discussion
Case Study
For therapists, understanding how predisposing, genetic factors for fear and anxiety
disorders and their interaction with the characteristics of stressors in the lives of their patients
can help identify potential therapeutic targets in the brain. The following case study illustrates
how information about the structures and pathways involved in fear and anxiety may be used in
the therapy room.
Background
At the time he was under my care, Mark was 62-year old, Latino gentleman, a veteran of
the conflict in Vietnam. Mark was diagnosed with severe PTSD and a history of major
depression. Prior to coming to the VA, he had lived with intense flashbacks for nearly two
decades without seeking treatment. Over that time, he felt increasingly isolated and
misunderstood, expressing that his family would become disinterested when he talked about his
experiences during the war. He remarked that it was it was “chicken-shit” to go to the VA for
many years. But when it started to affect his family, he sought treatment and had been going
every day since.
Mark was born in an agricultural community in the Central Valley of California, the son
of migrant farm workers. He stated that his family was poor, and he rarely saw his parents
because they were working in the fields for long hours. While Mark was in junior high school, he
and his family moved to Los Angeles where his home life was dominated by masculine pride or
“machismo.” During and beyond high school, Mark used dealt cocaine and marijuana to fellow
students and people in his neighborhood because few opportunities for upward mobility existed
for Mexican Americans. He reported multiple encounters with the police, and felt that he was

85
targeted for no compelling reasons. When he almost got in trouble with the law, he joined the
Marines.
In The Therapy Situation
In our initial sessions, Mark would appear aloof, and avoid eye contact while talking
about himself. He would often call me “Doc” and stated that he was used to interns “coming and
going” when they finished their training rotations. I assured him that my rotation was for a year,
so we had time. During sessions, he would often complain about “The Man,” and suspected that
I, also being a minority, could relate to this by expressing, “You know how it is.”
As our rapport grew, Mark related to me that he had the sense that he was “corrupted
morally,” and described himself as a “miserable father and bad husband.” He described instances
of becoming physically and verbally abusive towards his wife, and admitted that she went
through “a hell of a lot,” and that he is “one lucky bastard.” One of his goals in therapy was to
work on their relationship and to let her to know how much he appreciated her.
Despite his abusive behavior towards his wife, Mark reported that he was never abusive
toward his children. Realizing that his violent behavior and drug use might affect his children,
he worked as a truck driver and took jobs that would often transport him far away from his
family. Mark became tearful when he talked about his children, particularly his feelings about
denying them a good childhood. He stated that his children, however, saw him as a good father,
and I validated what they said. He had taken them from harms way by taking far away jobs to
shield them from his drug use and violent behavior.
Discussing War Experiences
When I would ask him about his experiences in combat, in the early phase of treatment,
Mark would say abruptly, “I did my time. I saw people die. Case closed.” He would then talk
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about his week. The was first time I realized that he was beginning to open up about his combat
experiences, Mark brought in medals and awards that he had earned while in the Marine Corps.
In a subsequent session, he brought in his dog tags and pictures he drew of soldiers – simplydrawn stick figures lined up in formation. To me, this was his way of approaching slowly toward
some of the challenges that he faced in combat and possibly a progression towards a past trauma.
I encouraged him to bring in more, my thought being to engage him in the therapy room,
creating the expectation that this was a place where he might experience anxiety (albeit safely)
from bringing up past traumas. But more importantly, I wanted him to feel like he had control
over this process, at his own pace and on his own terms. My goal was to evoke a level of anxiety
that was tolerable for him, still allowing for cognitive processing and new learning to occur.
Over subsequent sessions, he brought in comicstrip or storyboard-like drawings depicting
combat scenes. These initially had successful endings, with dead enemy soldiers and smiling
American soldiers with their arms raised. After commenting on how well-drawn they were, I
took out some paper and asked him to draw more. I also let him know that I was there to draw
with him if he wanted. Our drawing sessions together eventually produced scenes with
depictions of American soldiers losing limbs or being killed. I also noticed that the enthusiasm
that he possessed when he brought in his medals and initial drawings began to wane.
Fear at Inappropriate Times
During one session, Mark related a story that happened earlier in the week. While he was
gardening in his backyard, a police helicopter flew overhead. He indicated that he froze,
breathing heavily, and cowered with his arms folded over his head in his garden for 30 minutes.
After he related the story, he stared blankly at the sterile, white wall behind me, and was
speechless for several minutes. He said he felt ashamed that this response, and numerous others
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like it in the past, was beyond his control. Part of his shame stemmed from the fact that he knew
logically that he was set off by something that posed no danger to him.
I relayed to him that his paralysis was a hallmark of extreme fear that looked different
from fight-or flight. His response reflected the helplessness he felt. It also reflected his belief that
confronting or avoiding the threat were not options. During these moments, our reasoning skills
and memories that help us get a sense of where we are can become much more difficult to
access. We can easily miss other things in the environment that tell us we are safe because we
are so focused on the threat. I also let him know that the worry and tension from represented his
body preparing for a second stressor. In his day-to-day anxiety, his senses are attuned to many
things as if waiting and searching for a threat to manifest. In his body, these activated longlasting, chemical responses. And although anxiety does not typically activate a fear response, it
did for him and many others who suffer from PTSD and panic attacks. He had become very
sensitized to threat and his stress response system was heavily primed. And therein lay the
problem: although fear and anxiety evolved to promote survival, this was no longer the case for
him and that it was time to rewire.
He had encountered numerous stressors in his life that stemmed not only from the war,
but also from the racism, poverty, and long stretches of separation from his parents during
childhood. I let him know that the chronicity and often unpredictable nature of these stressors
had taken a heavy toll. Part of this was to learn about what was at stake for his brain and his
body. Chronic anxiety, when left unchecked, it continues to burn fuel: fuel taken from the rest of
the body in the form of immunosuppression and other physical problems. This depletion also
wears out systems in our brain responsible for judgment, memory, and organizing how we
perceive our environment.
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Flashback
In a session after a Thanksgiving holiday, Mark came in visibly shaken. Slow to speak,
he disclosed that he was unable to carve the turkey during dinner with his family after multiple
attempts. He stated that he could not take his eyes off the turkey. When he would put the carving
knife against it, his hands would shake violently. So finally, he stopped and let his son take over
the task.
When I asked what was going through his mind, he said that he was reminded of an event
during the war. A Viet Cong boy, probably no older than 15-years old, was surrounded by
Mark’s platoon. As Mark entered, his commanding officer ordered him to take the shot. With the
rest of his platoon egging him on to take the shot, he responded. The boy collapsed with a trail of
blood coming from his head. As celebratory cheers and back-slapping ensued, Mark recalled that
he could not feel anything. As he told this story, his face looked as if he were stunned,
completely unaware of his surroundings. I could finally see the trauma of a 19-year old Marine
who just took a life of another child.
He paused for a while before sobbing, “They told me step on his brains! And so I did!
That innocent kid! He didn’t do anything wrong! He was just trying to take care of his family!”
Mark burst into tears and said, “I’ve never told anyone that before.” Fear had overtaken him and
his limbic system was in overdrive, I thought. He could not think and so it was better to let his
body recover. And there was nothing I could do but sit with him silently and thank him for the
privilege to bear witness.
In the next session, when he was able to talk, we made an attemt to reconstruct the
narrative of what really happened. That horrific, pressured situation that unfolded quickly. It
tested his judgement, morality, but also the loss of his manhood and comraderie with his

89
So many things were beyond his control. the fact that he was under someone else’s command
and feeling compelled to follow orders. He stated that he feared the consequences if he
disobeyed. What would you have done knowing what you know now? To hand him the control
that he did not have during the horrifying situation.
Guidelines
In the last two months of our sessions, my plan shifted to giving Mark some tools he
might be able to use after my rotation ended. I decided to give him a set of guidelines to help him
return him to a place where fear and anxiety help might him, and not topple him. Within these
guidelines, incorporating mindfulness and systemtatic desensitization, contained steps to create a
place of centeredness that he could return to whenever he needed to recharge, education about
how threats are processed in the brain, triggers and responses, and steps to taking action to
confront the threats that counters passive responding.
Promoting calm. First, I wanted to create an awareness to a place of centeredness where
he could always return in moments of stress to calm limbic and HPA activity and to recharge.
Mark indicated that he learned meditation at the VA that focused on his breathing. He found it so
helpful in centering him that he built a meditation room at his home. He was so proud of it, he
invited me to his house to see it. Seeing an opportunity, I encouraged him to go further, beyond
focusing on his breath.
I encouraged him to focus on the body, noticing any tension that might be present. Next, I
asked him to focus on his emotions. I equated it to as catching ourselves in the emotional state,
particularly the stressful moments. In these moments, return to back to the body to focus on
breathing. Third, I encouraged him to focus on what his senses were taking in in the present
moment, getting used to the sight, the smell, as best as he could, then to ask himself, “Are you
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safe here?” Finally, I encouraged him to focus on his thoughts where he might ask himself “Is
your mind wandering back to past?” The goal of this was to be aware of and centered on the
present.
Basic fear and anxiety processing. Another part of these guidelines entailed discussing
how responses to the threat follow a bottom up or top-down process. In a bottom-up process, we
react to our environment and our senses dictate how we respond to a threat. In contrast, in a topdown process, we make choices. By doing so, we target thinking to activate higher brain centers
that help us to contextualize where we are, here and now, and what we can do.
Confronting threat: Identifying triggers and responses. I also encouraged him to
explore his responses to threats. This would be done in moments when he felt safe, but want to
challenge himself. I let Mark know that it was important to think about how they applied to him
without digressing from his emotions, and that this exercise could done with another person
present if he felt safer doing so. Several of the questions I asked him to consider are below.
•

Identifying triggers. What are things you consider to be anxiety-provoking, but non-life
threatening? What are things you consider to be life-threatening?

•

Identifying perception of control. What is your control over these things? Are they
predictable or unpredictable?

•

Identifying his responses to specific or diffuse triggers. Do you avoid or confront? Do
you feel immobilized over the situation or event?
Confronting threat: Promoting habituation. During our sessions, we employed some

desensitization techniques. I communicated to Mark that confronting some of the traumas in his
past through habituation can help with living with them, and that he could do this with the help
of another person. I also informed him that he may feel although he might feel frustrated about
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the speed of the process, this could be tempered by keeping in mind the process of extinguishing
fear is slow.
Using answers from his identified triggers, I asked him to bring up an image of a threat.
When doing so, it was important to keep a balance between moderate anxiety, thinking, and
knowing when to back down, and that this initiated the process of inhibiting the limbic system. I
reminded him that in these moments of safety, he had control to take in sensory information of
“what things are and what things are not,” and that he could return to his center if things become
too intense. If he could not bring himself to be in its presence, he could step back and take care
of his body by focusing on breathing and drawing awareness to his environment.
The next step was to ask himself, “What would I have done differently?” while knowing
that he has power to make choices in how to react to a situation: to run, to avoid, to confront,
how much you want to confront. To gather more ideas about other ways of responding, he could
talk to someone about how they might respond in a similar situation. Finally, I asked Mark to
make a list of these alternative responses, and rehearse them so that he would be armed with
knowledge and a plan about how to carry them out.
Limitations and Recommendations
Certain limitations of this study are noted forthright. The brain is a highly complex organ
and focusing on just a few structures is a dramatic simplification of involved neural processes.
Although many brain regions are involved in a variety of functions (e.g., stress and also reward),
discussion centered largely on their relationships to fear and anxiety for the purposes of this
study.
Despite rapid advances in neuroimaging that have allowed for a clearer understanding of
human brain functioning, research in affective neuroscience is still considered to be in its nascent
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stages. This is primarily due to limitations in anatomical resolution in neuroimaging that
continue to obscure finer details of neurocircuitry. With this in mind, animal studies are still
regarded as first-line evidence for detailing structure to function in the human brain, but continue
to pose challenges to hypothesis testing and generalizability to human populations.
Consequently, caution must be exercised when extrapolating and interpreting these data to
humans. Further, many of these studies in both the animal and human literature have small
sample sizes, further compromising generalizability.
From a cultural standpoint, can we assume that brain structures and pathways as the
overarching conceptualization. Threat triggers and expressions of fear and anxiety vary across
cultures, and assuming that the techniques used here will reduce clinical symptoms of anxiety
and fear from one cultural group to another may be problematic. The risk is that the triggers of
clinical fear and anxiety are often thought to be cognitive distortions, which may be stigmatizing,
negate one person’s experience over another’s, and may be detrimental between cultural and
generational contexts.
Despite these limitations, there is a certain urgency for mental health specialists to keep
up with the growing neuroscience literature that continues to parse out structure-to-function
issues in the brain with increasing specificity. But because this is daunting task, owing to a
translational gap between these fields, discourse between neuroscientists and clinical
psychologists is strongly encouraged. It is also recommended that teaching tools incorporate
translational research to address the language barrier.
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APPENDIX A
Davis - Mapping Fear and Anxiety
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Evolving from his research on the amygdala, Davis and his colleagues set out to map the
neural pathway of potentiated fear as measured by acoustic startle. The short latency of fearpotentiated startle implied a simple pathway in the brain. To understand where this response was
processed, Davis and his colleagues employed retrograde tracing to determine axonal projections
from their point of termination to their source (i.e. synapse to cell body). By injecting chemical
tracers within the acoustic startle reflex, the authors found corresponding efferents from different
cell bodies in the CeA (Davis et al., 2010).
After failing to reconcile the ineffectiveness of anxiolytic compounds on expressions of
fear, Davis shifted his attention to understanding the mechanisms for anxiety. Other research
showed that benzodiazepines have an anxiolytic effect in rats on the elevated plus maze test, but
lesions to the amygdala did not produce anxiolytic effects on this test, suggesting that
mechanisms for anxiety differed from that of the fear pathway (Davis, 1998a; Davis et al., 1997).
To explore the possibility of differential involvement of the BNST, Davis phasic fear and
anxiety (defined as sustained fear), Davis and his colleagues conducted a series of chemical and
mechanical lesion studies on both structures. He found that lesions to the CeA blocked fearpotentiated startle, and that lesions to the BNST blocked light-enhanced startle.
Through a series of tracing studies, the implication of a neighboring structure, bed
nucleus of the stria terminalis (BNST), emerged. an anterograde tracer - a method used to
chemically trace axonal projections from their source (the cell body) to their point of termination
(the synapse) - was infused into the posterior part of the basolateral nucleus of the amygdala.
The brain was later sectioned so as to capture labeled terminals in both the CeA and the BNST.
Davis found that many fibers terminate in the CeA, but many pass through the CeA to terminate
in the BNST. He proposed that electrical stimulation or mechanical lesions of the CeA not only
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disrupt cells in the CeA, but also disconnect the basolateral amygdala from the BNST (Davis &
Shi, 1999).
Davis states, “Most of the literature on the amygdala involves an analysis of the role of
the CeA using various measures of fear, primarily in rodents. However, many effects attributed
to the CeA may actually result from disconnecting the basolateral nucleus from the BNST
because the fibers that connect the BLA to the BNST pass right through the CeA.”
Davis concluded that electrical or chemical stimulation of the CeA not only can activate
CeA cells that project to the hypothalamus and brainstem but also CeA cells that project to the
BNST. Similarly, chemical, fiber-sparing lesions of the CeA also can block inputs from the CeA
to the BNST. Hence, manipulations of the CeA potentially will always have these dual effects
on the CeA and the BNST (Davis & Whalen, 2001). He concluded that the amygdala and BNST
have differential roles – specifically, that the seat of fear lies within the amygdala, whereas
anxiety stems from the BNST (Davis, 1998b; Walker & Davis, 1997b).
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APPENDIX B
Implications of the Extended Amygdala
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The amygdala was believed to be responsible for both fear and anxiety responses in much
of the neuroscience literature and is the current knowledge in clinical psychology. This was
obscured due to methodological issues in lesion studies. Namely, boundaries of the amygdala
and where the lesions were being made within the amygdala obscured these findings. The
implications are summarized below.
•

The BNST has numerous similarities to the CeA in terms of anatomical properties,
transmitter content, cell morphology, and efferent connections in primates and humans
(Price, Martin, Powers, & Dellovade, 1991; Shammah-Lagnado et al., 2000).

•

The CeA and BNST share a strong alliance tied through dense neural connections (Dong
et al., 2001).

•

A robust level of temporal coordination between the inputs and outputs of CeA and
BNST neurons support the idea of that these structures share functions (Nagy & Pare,
2008).

•

Both receive strong glutamatergic inputs from the basolateral amygdala (Davis et al.,
2010).

•

In addition, CeA and BNST neurons send robust projections to an overlapping set of
autonomic and motor brainstem nuclei thought to generate components of fear and
anxiety responses (Davis et al., 2010).

•

The posterolateral division of the BNST has many of the same hypothalamic and
brainstem projections as the CeA so that outputs from the basolateral nucleus of the
amygdala to the BNST can eventually activate the same targets as the CeA does (Davis,
1998b).
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•

In addition, the CeA projects heavily to the lateral division of the BNST. Collectively
this is known as the lateral extended amygdala (Davis, 1998b).
These similarities are so striking that anatomical debate continues to surround whether or

not they are the same entity (Alheid, 2012; Holstege, Meiners, & Tan, 1985). The anatomist
Lennart Heimer, who assumed that the CeA and BNST belonged to the same anatomical entity
and termed this system the “extended amygdala” due to similarities in transmitter content, cell
morphology, and overlapping connections (Davis & Whalen, 2001; Fudge & Haber, 2001).
The term “extended amygdala” has been used to describe the neural continuum between the
centromedial amygdala and the BNST (Alheid, 2012). Tracing studies provided evidence
supporting the idea of the extended amygdala.
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APPENDIX C
Davis – Paradigms for Measuring Fear and Anxiety
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Measuring Fear – Fear-potentiated Startle Paradigm (Davis and Astrachan, 1978).
Based on the notion that startle increases significantly when one is already afraid, Davis &
Astrachan (1978) pioneered the fear-potentiated startle paradigm in rats. Conditioned fear is
defined as elevated startle amplitude in the presence versus the absence of a conditioned,
acoustic stimulus.
•

Baseline startle is established by presenting small number of acoustic startle stimuli (i.e.,
loud noise) to an animal and allowing habituation to occur to achieve a stable level of
amplitude.

•

On the next day, train the animal to be afraid of light by pairing with shock. No startle
test given on this day.

•

Testing is conducted the after a period of time (1-30 days) by eliciting acoustic startle in
absence or presence of a light (presented for 3-4 seconds).

•

Difference in startle amplitude elicited in the presence vs. absence of light, and the
original baseline level of startle is used to define the magnitude of conditioned fear (fear
potentiated startle).
Through these experiments, startle amplitude was found to be significantly higher when

elicited by the same auditory stimulus in presence of light. In addition, when startle was elicited
at various times during testing, it increased almost immediately after light onset and returned to
baseline shortly after the light went off (Davis & Whalen, 2001; Walker & Davis, 1997a). This
suggests that fear-potentiated startle is time sensitive to the presence of emotionally significant
stimulus, namely, that it acts in a phasic manner and recovers quickly.
Measuring Anxiety - Light Enhanced Startle Paradigm. Whereas fear acts in phasic
manner and recovers quickly, anxiety is sustained. Coupled with research indicating that rats
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find light to be anxiety provoking, the authors used a light-enhanced startle paradigm. Along
with data from mechanical and chemical lesion studies, electrical stimulation and local infusion
of various compounds to were employed to determine functions of the amygdala and BNST
(Davis & Whalen, 2001; Walker et al., 2009).
•

Rats are exposed to light for a long duration (5-20 minutes)

•

They become anxious in the presence of light (and not dark, so this is species specific).
There is no conditioned stimulus (e.g. foot shock) presented. Light enhanced startle does
not depend on specific cue conditioning (Walker & Davis, 1997a).

•

When the acoustic stimulus is presented, rats startle more significantly just to light (light
enhanced startle)

•

Startle amplitude was directly related to intensity of light
Differences between FPS and LES. Fear-potentiated startle reflects anticipatory fear of a

specific and imminent threat (i.e., shock). In contrast, light-enhanced startle is a more diffuse
response to a less certain threat. The temporal profile of startle increases in these two paradigms
is also different: Fear-potentiated startle has a very rapid onset and offset, measured in
milliseconds to seconds respectively. Light-enhanced (as well as CRF-enhanced) startle having
a more gradual onset and offset. These characteristics have been used to distinguish between
‘fear’ and ‘anxiety’, respectively (Walker et al., 2009).

114

APPENDIX D
BNST Outputs

115

Source

Target

Responses

Reference

BNST

Parabrachial nuclei

Stress-elicited alterations in
feeding behavior

(C.-S. Li & Cho,
2006)

Medial bed
nucleus of the
stria terminalis
(BSTm)

Basal forebrain

Social approach/ aversion,
motivational/behavioral
differences between
social/asocial species

(Goodson, 2006)

Juxtacapsular
nucleus
(BNSTju)

Vetromedial caudoputamen, anterior basolateral amygdalar nucleus

Visceromotor responses,
autonomic responses with
somatomotor activity in
adaptive behaviors

(Dong, Petrovich, &
Swanson, 2000)

Caudal substantia innominate, mesencephalic reticular nucleus, retrorubral area

Somatomotor outflow

Prelimbic, infralimbic and ventral CA1 cortical areas; posterior basolateral,
posterior basomedial, and lateral amygdalar nuclei; paraventricular and medial
mediodorsal thalamic nuclei; subthalamic and parasubthalamic nuclei of
hypothalamus; ventrolateral periqueductal gray
Oval nuclei
BSTov)

Caudal substantia innominata, adjacent central amygdalar nucleus, retrorubral area,
and lateral parabrachial nucleus; caudal nucleus accumbens, parasubthalamic
nucleus, and medial and ventrolateral divisions of the periaqueductal gray; anterior
parvicellular part of the hypothalamic paraventricular nucleus and nucleus of the
solitary tract

Autonomic, neuroendocrine,
and ingestive behavioral
responses during stress

(Dong, 2001b)

Fusiform nuclei
(BSTfu)

Nucleus accumbens, caudal substantia innominata and central amygdalar nucleus,
thalamic paraventricular nucleus, hypothalamic paraventricular and periventricular
nuclei, hypothalamic dorsomedial nucleus, perifornical lateral hypothalamic area,
and lateral tegmental nucleus; parastrial, tuberal, dorsal raphe, and parabrachial
nuclei and in the retrorubral area, ventrolateral division of the periaqueductal gray,
and pontine central gray; olfactory tubercle, lateral septal nucleus, posterior
basolateral amygdalar nucleus, supramammillary nucleus, and nucleus of the
solitary tract.

Autonomic, neuroendocrine,
and ingestive behavioral
responses during stress

(Dong, 2001b)
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Posterior BNST
Principal nucleus

Septal and hypothalamic regions

Reproductive and
visceromotor responses

Interfascicular
nucleus

Septal and hypothalamic regions

Defensive and reproductive
behaviors

Transverse
nucleus

Midbrain parts of the behavior control column

Foraging/exploratory behavior

All three nuclei

Medial amygdalar nucleus, lateral septal nucleus, nucleus accumbens and
substantia innominata, hypothalamic parts of the behavior control column,
hypothalamic periventricular region (patterned neuroendocrine and autonomic
responses)

Anterolateral
area and BSTal
and BSTsc

Somatomotor system: nucleus accumbens, substantia innominata, ventral tegmental
area, and retrorubral area and adjacent midbrain reticular nucleus

(Dong, 2004)

Visceral and somatic motor
responses, especially in
response to noxious stimuli

(Dong, 2004)

Neuroendocrine, autonomic,
and behavioral or somatic
responses associated with
maintaining energy balance
homeostasis

(Dong & Swanson,
2005a)

Central autonomic control system: central amygdalar nucleus, dorsal lateral
hypothalamic area, ventrolateral periaqueductal gray, parabrachial nucleus, and
nucleus of the solitary tract
Neuroendocrine system: paraventricular and supraoptic nuclei, hypothalamic
visceromotor pattern generator network
Thalamocortical feedback loops: midline, medial, and intralaminar nuclei
Anteromedial
Area

Neuroendocrine system: regions containing magnocellular oxytocin neurons,
parvicellular corticotropin-releasing hormone, thyrotropin-releasing hormone,
somatostatin, and dopamine neurons
Central autonomic control network: central amygdalar nucleus, descending
paraventricular nucleus, and ventrolateral periaqueductal gray
Five of six known components of the hypothalamic visceromotor pattern generator
network
Behavior control column: descending paraventricular nucleus and associated
arcuate nucleus; ventral tegmental area and associated nucleus accumbens and
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substantia innominata
Behavioral state control: supramammillary and tuberomammillary nuclei
Dorsomedial
Nucleus

Humeral sensory-related (subfornical organ and median preoptic nucleus)
Neuroendocrine system (magnocellular): oxytocin, vasopressin; parvicellular:
gonadotropin-releasing hormone, somatostatin, thyrotropin-releasing hormone,
corticotropin-releasing hormone

Initiating drinking behavior
and salt appetite, homeostatic
and behavioral responses
associated thirst and salt
appetite.

Central autonomic control network: central amygdalar nucleus, BST anterolateral
group, descending paraventricular hypothalamic nucleus, retrochiasmatic area,
ventrolateral periaqueductal gray, Barrington’s nucleus
Hypothalamic visceromotor pattern-generator network (five of six known
components)
Behavior control column
Descending paraventricular nucleus
Lateral medial preoptic nucleus
Anterior hypothalamic nucleus
Ventral tegmental area, along with interconnected nucleus accumbens and
substantia innominata
Retrorubral area
Paraventricular, central medial, intermediodorsal, and medial mediodorsal nuclei
Nucleus reuniens
Subparaventricular zone, ventrolateral preoptic nucleus, tuberomammillary
nucleus, supramammillary nucleus, lateral habenula, and raphe nuclei

Ingestive
Reproductive
Defensive
Foraging
Orofacial motor control
Thalamocortical feedback
loops
Behavioral state control

(Dong & Swanson,
2005b)

